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INTRO DUCTION 
Calabresi and Melamed began a scholarly revolution by showing 
that legal entitlements have two readily distinguishable forms of pro­
tection: property rules and liability rules.1 These two archetypal forms 
protect an entitlement holder's interest in markedly different ways -
via deterrence or compensation. Property rules protect entitlements 
by trying to deter others from taking. Liability rules, on the other hand, 
protect entitlements not by deterring but by trying to compensate the 
victim of nonconsensual takings.2 Accordingly, the compensatory im­
petus behind liability rules focuses on the takee's welfare - making 
sure the sanction is sufficient to compensate the takee. The deterrent 
impetus behind property rules, however, focuses on the potential 
taker's welfare - making sure the sanction is sufficient to deter the 
taker. Thus, disgorgement and prison terms exemplify traditional 
property rule remedies, while expectation and other compensatory 
damages fall squarely within the liability rule camp. 
Viewing liability rules as a distinct category of entitlement allowed 
Calabresi and Melamed to identify a missing category in the way 
courts resolved nuisance disputes. Consider the classic, if somewhat 
idealized, nuisance dispute between a single "Polluter" and a single 
"Resident" who is discomforted by the pollution. Prior to One View of 
the Cathedral, courts traditionally chose from among three categories 
of judgment: 
Rule 1 :  the court issues an injunction against the Polluter; 
Rule 2: the court finds the Polluter has created a nuisance 
but permits pollution to continue provided the 
Polluter pays damages; or 
1. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inaliena­
bility: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
2. Property rules also often protect entitlements from intentional takings, while liability 
rules protect them from negligent takings. Hence, you commit a criminal offense if you in­
tentionally break your neighbor's arm (i.e., a property rule protects the integrity of her arm 
with regard to your intentional taking), but you owe your neighbor compensatory damages if 
you break her arm through mere negligence (i.e., a liability rule protects the integrity of her 
arm with regard to your negligent taking). 
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Rule 3: the court finds the Polluter has not created a nui­
sance and permits pollution to continue without 
restriction. 
3 
Appreciating the difference between liability and property rules, 
Calabresi and Melamed saw that the three approaches above naturally 
fit into a two-by-two box. In this stylized box (shown in Figure 1) ,  the 
court determines (i) whether the Resident or the Polluter should have 
the initial entitlement to control whether pollution will occur,3 and (ii) 
whether to protect this entitlement with a property or a liability rule.4 
FIGURE 1: CALABRESI AND MELAMED'S Two-BY-Two Box 
WITH THE MISSING CATEGORY 
..... 
c Q) 
s Rule 1 Rule 2 Q) -
.<;::: ..... 
c 
� 
Rule 3 [Rule 4] 
This traditional tripartite approach to nuisance disputes, however, 
leaves one of the boxes empty. Calabresi and Melamed's theory thus 
suggests a fourth approach: 
3. Like Calabresi and Melamed, see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1091-93, we 
use the term "initial" entitlement to convey the idea that, because of the possibility of a sub­
sequent taking, the ultimate entitlement to control whether or not pollution will take place 
may belong to a taker. 
4. Rule 1, for example, represents a decision in which the court grants the initial enti­
tlement to the Resident and protects it with a property rule. This deters the Polluter, with 
the threat of contempt of court, from taking the entitlement nonconsensually. In contrast, 
Rule 2 awards the initial entitlement to the Resident but protects it only with a less stringent, 
compensation-based liability rule under which the Polluter still might nonconsensually take 
the Resident's entitlement but pay compensatory damages for doing so. Rule 2 was famously 
deployed in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). Finally, Rule 3 
finds the pollution not to be a nuisance at all, thereby effectively giving the initial entitle­
ment to continue polluting freely to the Polluter under a property rule. 
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Rule 4: the court permits pollution to continue unless the 
Resident pays the Polluter damages.5 
As fate would have it, the fourth box would not stay empty long. In 
Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., Justice James 
D. Cameron of the Arizona Supreme Court - in what has probably 
become the most cited "coming to the nuisance" court decision -
held that the pollution could be enjoined, but only if the developer 
representing the Residents would "indemnify [the Polluter] for a rea­
sonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down."6 Calabresi 
and Melamed's good fortune in identifying a vacuum that was almost 
simultaneously filled helped solidify their article's well-deserved fame. 
This narrative is well known to the vast majority of tort (and prop­
erty) professors.7 However, the legal academy seems much less aware 
of an analogous phenomenon that has been developing over the last 
decade. Starting in 1993 with Madeline Morris's article, The Structure 
of Entitlements,8 a group of about a half dozen scholars began to con­
ceive of "liability rule" protection as a type of "call option."9 Just as 
5. In a recent symposium honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of One View of the Ca­
thedral, Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year 
Retrospective, 106 YA LE L.J. 2083-2213  (1997), Calabresi pointed out that James Atwood 
had discussed the possibility of a Rule 4-like outcome in a student note that he published in 
the Stanford Law Review three years before Calabresi and Melamed's analysis. See Guido 
Calabresi, Remarks: The Simple Virtues of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2201, 2204 (1997) 
(citing James R. Atwood, Note, An Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 293, 315 (1969)). 
6. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (Cameron, 
V.C.J.). The court's unconditional order seems different than the definition of Rule 4 in the 
text, which gives the Resident the choice of whether (a) to pay to stop further pollution or 
(b) not to pay and to allow the Polluter to continue polluting. To harmonize the case with 
the definition, we must speculate about what would have happened if Del Webb (the devel­
oper representing the Residents) had petitioned to void the court order enjoining the pollu­
tion as well as the order that Del Webb indemnify Spur (the Polluter). If we believe that the 
court would have allowed Del Webb to withdraw its initial complaint and thereby void the 
consequent court orders, it would have in effect given Del Webb the Rule 4 choice - that is, 
the choice to pay to stop the pollution or not to pay and allow the pollution to continue. At a 
minimum, future developers will at least realize that suing in this jurisdiction may in effect 
be choosing to pay for an injunction. 
7. Indeed, probably a dozen other articles aver, in one way or another, to this history. 
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines 
as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, 
Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 440, 
442 (1995). 
8. Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854-56 
(1993). 
9. See, e.g., Jan Ayres, The 1998 Monsanto Lecture: Protecting Property with Puts, 32 
VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998); Jan Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Prop­
erty Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 729-33 (1996); Ian Ayres & Eric 
Talley, Salamonie Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 
YALE L.J. 1027 (1995); Richard Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of 
Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2093 (1997); Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 470-75; 
Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 
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the property versus liability rule distinction helped Calabresi and 
Melamed discover the missing Rule 4, the call-option reconceptualiza­
tion of the two liability rules (Rules 2 and 4) naturally led to the rec­
ognition of two additional "put-option" liability rules. 
A call is an option to buy. The option holder can force a sale at the 
exercise price even if the seller does not want to sell. Rules 2 and 4 
have just this type of "call" quality. Under Rule 2, the Polluter has a 
call option in the form of the choice to pay damages - the choice, in 
effect, to buy the Resident's right to clean air and, thus, the ability to 
continue polluting. The Resident possesses the initial entitlement (the 
right to stop the pollution), but the Polluter can force the Resident to 
sell this right for a judicially determined amount. Rule 4, on the other 
hand, reverses the rights of the Polluter and Resident. Under Rule 4, 
the Polluter possesses the initial entitlement, while the Resident has 
the call option, and for a judicially determined amount, the Resident 
can therefore force the Polluter to cede this right to pollute.10 
Once scholars reconceived traditional liability rules as call options 
for potential takers, they inevitably began to wonder whether "put­
option" rules might not also serve a role. A put is an option to sell. 
While call options give option holders the choice to pay a nonnegotia­
ble amount (the exercise price), put options give option holders the 
choice to be paid a nonnegotiable amount. Call options when exer­
cised give rise to "forced sales," but put options give rise to "forced 
purchases." 
Accordingly, Rule 2 gives the Polluter the choice to pay, and Rule 
4 gives the Resident the choice to pay. Scholars considering the classic 
Rule 2 and Rule 4 court decisions - Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.11 
and Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. 12- have 
often focused only on the difference as to who pays, but a second di­
mension exists as to who chooses to force the payment (i.e., the choice 
to be paid). Rules 2 and 4 concern a choice to pay, while the put op­
tions concern the choice to be paid. 
As applied to nuisance disputes, the use of put options suggests 
two additional rules that give the initial entitlement holder a put op­
tion in the form of an option to force a nonconsensual purchase by the 
other side: 
YALE L.J. 2149 (1997); Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175 
(1997) (referring to this feature of liability rules as simply an "option"). 
10. Property rules (Rules 1 and 3) can also fit easily into a call-option framework: the 
only difference between a property rule and a liability rule is the difference in the potential 
taker's exercise price. Property rules set the exercise price so high that no option holder 
would choose to exercise the option. See Ayres & Talley. supra note 9, at 1048. 
11 .  257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). 
12. 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). 
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Rule 5 :  the court permits pollution to continue but also 
grants the Polluter the option to stop polluting 
and to receive damages from the Resident; and 
Rule 6: the court permits the Resident to enjoin the pol­
lution but also grants the Resident the option to 
waive this injunctive right in return for damages 
from the Polluter. 
These "put-option" rules - like their "call-option" counterparts 
- are still "liability rules," designed to compensate the initial entitle­
ment holder for any nonconsensual transfers of that entitlement rather 
than to deter such transfers altogether. The two differ only in that put 
options allow the initial entitlement holder to force nonconsensual 
transfers, whereas under the more traditional call-option liability rule 
the initially unentitled party can force transfers. 
Thus, we can expand Figure 1, as shown in Figure 2, to help flesh 
out the underlying structure of the six rules: 
FIGURE 2: IN CORPORA TING THE POSSIBILITY 
OF "PUT-OPTION" RULES 
Rule 1 Rule2 Rule6 
Rule3 Rule4 Rule5 
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The two new "put-option" rules - Rules 5 and 6 - resemble each 
other, but under Rule 5, the Polluter has the initial entitlement and 
put option, whereas under Rule 6, the Resident has the initial entitle­
ment and put option. 13 Thus, the three columns of Figure 2 differ only 
as to which party has the option to force a nonconsensual transfer of 
the initial entitlement: under a property rule, neither side has an op­
tion to force a transfer; under a traditional liability rule, the unentitled 
party has the option to force the initial entitlement holder to sell; and 
under a "put-option" rule, the entitlement holder has the option to 
force the unentitled party to purchase. 
While courts have not used "put-option" rules to resolve nuisance 
disputes, they have granted put-option awards as a standard response 
to intentional takings in other areas of tort law. 
Contrary to accepted wisdom, the common law frequently employs "put 
options" - that is, the right to force a nonconsensual purchase - as a 
mechanism for protecting entitlements. For example, if Calabresi steals 
Melamed's watch, Melamed has the option of suing to recover the watch 
(replevin) or suing to receive the watch's value (trover). Similarly, if 
Calabresi remains as a holdover tenant in Melamed's apartment, 
Melamed has the option of suing to enjoin Calabresi's continuing tres­
pass or (at least in some jurisdictions) suing to force Calabresi to pay rent 
for up to an entire additional year. Finally, if Calabresi builds an en­
croaching wall on Melamed's land, Melamed has the option of suing to 
force Calabresi to remove the wall or suing to force Calabresi to perma­
nently buy the land on which he has encroached. In each of these exam­
ples, once Calabresi takes Melamed's entitlement, the common law 
grants Melamed a put option - the option to choose court-determined 
damages (for permanently ceding the entitlement to the defendant) or 
injunctive relief (to reacquire the entitlement).14 
In the nuisance context, instead of giving an Atlantic Cement the (call­
option) choice of deciding whether to pay to pollute [Rule 2], a court 
might give a Boomer the {put-option) choice of whether to be paid 
(and bear continued pollution) or to refuse payment (and win an in­
junction against continued pollution) [Rule 6]. 
Scholars have already made some important progress in analyzing 
and clarifying the four liability rules (2, 4, 5, and 6). We now know, for 
example, that under any of four liability rules, courts should set 
damages equal to the court's best estimate of the value of the party 
not possessing a call or put option.15 Authors have also put forward a 
13. Some authors have reversed the labels of Rules 5 and 6. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 
9, at 797 n.9; Levmore, supra note 9, at 2163. 
14. Ayres, supra note 9, at 800. 
15. See Ayres, supra note 9; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Li­
ability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HA RV. L. REV. 713, 719 (1996). 
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series of reasons why "put-option" rules might at times dominate 
"call-option" rules.16 To date, however, very little of this analysis has 
addressed a very basic question: to whom should courts award the ini­
tial entitlement? Most authors - if they address this question at all -
suggest that courts should grant the initial entitlement to the litigant it 
believes values it more. The Restatement (Second) of Torts codifies 
this standard and directs courts to consider whether "the gravity of the 
harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct" in deciding whether 
an act constitutes a nuisance. 17 Although the idea of simply giving the 
entitlement to its higher valuer makes eminent sense in terms of allo­
cative efficiency under the property rule regimes (Rules 1 and 3), it 
does not make sense when choosing among the four liability rules 
(Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6).18 At its core, this Article applies mathematical 
reasoning to provide practical advice on choosing among liability 
rules.19 In doing so, we both simplify and expand the range of judicial 
choice. 
We simplify judicial choice by revealing a deeper structure under­
lying liability rules. Despite popular belief, maximal allocative effi­
ciency has nothing to do with who is given the initial entitlement. For 
example, Rule 2 - which confers the initial entitlement on the Resi­
dent (subject to the Polluter's call option) - produces the exact ex 
post allocations, for every possible combination of Polluter and Resi­
dent valuations, as Rule 5 - which confers the initial entitlement on 
the Polluter, along with a put option. Courts concerned about alloca­
tive efficiency should therefore focus not on who is given the initial 
entitlement but rather on delegating the allocative choice to the liti­
gant who is the more efficient chooser. 
Our analysis also expands judicial choice by showing that an infi­
nite number of distributive implementations exists within four funda­
mental classes of liability rules. While any rule within a particular class 
allocates the entitlement between the litigants identically, this multiplic­
ity of implementations within each rule is far from redundant, because 
each implementation divides the expected total payoff differently. Thus, 
16. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 801-13; Krier & Schwab, supra note 7; Levmore, supra 
note 9, at 2168-72. 
17. RESTATEMENT (SECO ND) O FTORT S § 826(a) (1979). 
18. See discussion infra Section LB. 
19. For recent discussions on the separate and important question of whether and under 
what conditions liability rules dominate (or are dominated by) property rules, see Ayres & 
Talley, supra note 9; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Non­
consensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235 (1995) [hereinafter Consensual 
and Nonconsensual Advantages]; Epstein, supra note 9; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15; 
and Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to 
Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J. 221 (1995) [hereinafter A Reply to Ayres and Talley]. 
In the Conclusion, we return to this issue and show how our analysis also informs our 
understanding of when property rules will likely dominate liability rules. See infra notes 159-
164 and accompanying text. 
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a central finding of this Article is to show that judges can decouple al­
locative and distributive concerns. In other words, a court's decisions 
about how to maximize ex post allocative efficiency need not affect its 
decisions about which distribution will best promote equity or ex ante 
investment. 
From the perspective of the initial entitlement holder, liability 
rules seem to have compensation as its central aim. But from an effi­
ciency perspective liability rules are a means by which an imperfectly 
informed court can delegate the allocative choice to private litigants 
who potentially have superior allocative information. For example, a 
traditional liability rule (Rule 2) can be seen as the court delegating 
the allocative choice to the Polluter. The Polluter chooses whether to 
pollute, pay damages to the Resident, and thereby allocate the enti­
tlement to itself, or to allocate the entitlement to the Resident and 
thus pay nothing. In this Article, we provide a theory of how to dele­
gate such allocative choice optimally. 
The four liability rules of Figure 2 (Rules 2, 4, 5, and 6) give rise to 
just two fundamental allocative classes, corresponding to the identity 
of the chooser. For convenience, we call these "single-chooser" rules 
because only one of the litigants determines the entitlement's final al­
location. Rules 2 and 5 constitute "defendant-choice" rules because 
they give the defendant the allocative choice,20 while Rules 4 and 6 
constitute "plaintiff-choice" rules, which give the plaintiff the alloca­
tive choice. There is a continuum of defendant-choice rules and a con­
tinuum of plaintiff-choice rules, but all the defendant-choice rules (in­
cluding Rules 2 and 5) allocate the entitlement identically and only 
differ in the amount of the side payments that are made between the 
parties. Likewise, there is a continuum of plaintiff-choice rules (includ­
ing Rules 4 and 6) that identically allocate the entitlement, albeit with 
different side payments. 
We also identify, however, two further fundamental classes of li­
ability rules. We dub these "dual-chooser" rules in contradistinction to 
the single-chooser rules because both the plaintiff and the defendant 
potentially impact the final allocation of the entitlement.21 One class of 
such dual-chooser rules allots the entitlement to the plaintiff unless 
20. Under Rule 2 as applied to our Resident and Polluter example, the Polluter has the 
(call-option) choice either to pollute and pay damages or to refrain and pay nothing; under 
Rule 5 the Polluter has a (put-option) choice either to refrain from polluting and receive 
damages or to pollute and receive nothing. Under either rule, the Resident has no power to 
affect the ultimate allocation except by bargaining with the Polluter in the shadow of these 
defendant-choice rules. 
21. Jack Balkin and Ian Ayres have previously analyzed second-order liability rules, 
which, like dual-chooser liability rules, give both litigants a voice in the ultimate allocation. 
See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9. But unlike second-order (or higher) rules, which require 
successively higher exercise prices, the dual-chooser rules at the center of this Article con­
cern a single set of exercise prices on which both litigants base their decisions. We compare 
and contrast dual-chooser rules and second-order rules more fully in Part III, infra. 
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both parties agree to shift it for a court-determined price to the defen­
dant. In other words, either party has the power to veto allocation of 
the entitlement to the defendant. Either the plaintiff or the defendant 
can thereby cause the entitlement to be allocated to the plaintiff. We 
call this subclass of rules "plaintiff-presumption" allocations. The 
other subclass of dual-chooser rules allows either party unilaterally to 
cause the entitlement to be allocated to the defendant, and we corre­
spondingly label these "defendant-presumption" allocations. As with 
single-chooser rules, we will give multiple option interpretations of 
these dual-chooser rules and show that there are an infinite number of 
rules within each of these classes that produce identical entitlement 
allocations, but which affect how the disputants divide the entitle­
ment's value. 
In one sense, the dual-chooser rules represent a kind of centralized 
planning writ small. Under these rules, the government (that is, a 
judge) sets a price for the entitlement and then essentially asks both 
litigants whether they want to trade at that price. While this charac­
terization makes the dual-chooser rules seem esoteric and unworldly, 
we argue that in some legal contexts, these rules are already being 
used. Moreover, we show conditions under which a dual-chooser rule 
systematically produces greater allocative efficiency than either class 
of single-chooser rules.22 
The stylized panels of Figure 3 graphically depict our four core al­
locative equilibria. These panels graph the range of possible plaintiff 
valuations on the horizontal axis and the range of potential defendant 
valuations on the vertical axis. If judges possess perfect information 
about litigants' valuations, they could achieve first-best allocative effi­
ciency by granting entitlements to defendants whenever the defen­
dants' values surpassed the plaintiffs' values. Accordingly, a fully in­
formed judge would apply a decision rule falling along the dashed 
diagonal lines in the panels. 
22. Madeleine Morris mentions in passing the theoretical possibility of "dual-chooser," 
rules, but she does not identify circumstances when they might be advisable nor does she 
suggest the possibility of their existence in current legal practice. See Morris, supra note 8, at 
854; see also Ayres, supra note 9, at 823-35 (discussing the possibility of such rules); 
RONEN A YRAHAM, MODULAR LIABILITY RULES, (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law 
& Econ., Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No. 01-003, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=272816 (addressing extensively the ra­
tionales for such rules). 
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An imperfectly informed judge, however, can instead resort to li­
ability rules to harness the litigants' superior private information re­
garding their own values.23 As pictured in panel (a), the class of 
plaintiff-choice single-chooser allocations vertically partitions the 
23. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 725. 
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valuation space. Consequently, plaintiffs who value the entitlement 
more than the damage amount will keep the entitlement for them­
selves under these rules, while plaintiffs who value the entitlement less 
will allocate the entitlement to the defendants. 
Panel (b) depicts the analogous horizontal allocative partition that 
the defendant-choice single-chooser allocations produce. For this class 
of rules, the court vests the defendants with the power to allocate the 
entitlement to themselves when their valuations exceed the damage 
amount, or to allocate the entitlement to the plaintiffs when their 
valuations fall short of judicially chosen damages. While these single­
chooser allocations do not achieve the first-best allocative efficiency 
possible under perfect information, they can still enhance allocative 
efficiency. They give choosers incentives to make the most efficient 
allocative choices they can, given their private information. In other 
words, choosers have an advantage over courts because they know 
their own valuations, even though, like the courts, they know only the 
probability distributions of their opponents' valuations. 
Panels ( c) and ( d) illustrate the partitions for the dual-chooser 
rules. Panel (c) shows the plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser alloca­
tion, in which the entitlement remains with the plaintiff unless both 
the plaintiff and the defendant opt to transfer it. Such transfers take 
place only if the damage amount exceeds the plaintiff's valuation and 
the defendant's valuation exceeds the damage amount. If, on the other 
hand, the plaintiff's valuation exceeds the damage amount, the plain­
tiff will choose to keep the entitlement and forego the damage pay­
ment the defendant would otherwise have made. Conversely, when 
the damage amount exceeds the defendant's valuation, the defendant 
will refuse to accept the entitlement rather than pay the higher dam­
age amount. Similarly, panel ( d) shows the analogous defendant­
presumption dual-chooser allocation, which ultimately allocates the 
entitlement to the defendant unless both parties opt for transfer to the 
plaintiff. 
All four classes of rules allocate the upper left quadrant to the de­
fendant and the lower right quadrant to the plaintiff. But there are two 
crucial differences. First, the four types of rules may differ as to what 
damage amounts produce optimal efficiency. We will show that the 
optimal damages for all the rules within a class are the same, but that 
optimal damages may differ among the classes. One of our tasks in this 
Article will be to derive the optimal damages for each of the four 
classes. Second, the rules differ as to how they allocate the "off­
diagonal" quadrants (i.e., the lower-left and upper-right quadrants). 
The dual-chooser allocations give both of these off-diagonal quadrants 
to the same litigant, while the single-chooser allocations split their 
ownership, one quadrant to each party. Therefore, to determine which 
of the four basic liability classes maximizes allocative efficiency in any 
given situation, a court in effect will need to determine which litigant 
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will likely make the more efficient allocative choice within each of 
these off-diagonal quadrants. Accordingly, a second task of the Article 
is to provide guidance for judges determining which of the four classes 
in Figure 3 maximizes allocative efficiency, given judges' imperfect in­
formation. 
The infinite number of distributive implementations within each 
class allows courts to decouple allocative and distributive decisions, 
because each implementation within a class divides a constant of 
expected total payoffs among the litigants differently.24 Courts choos­
ing from among this expanded set of liability rules should first choose 
the type of class, that maximizes ex post allocative efficiency, and then 
choose the implementation within the class that best meets the dis­
tributive demands of equity· or best aligns ex ante investment incen­
tives. 
The core allocative decision involves the optimal number and iden­
tity of the choosers. Selection from among these four allocative classes 
will turn on judicial beliefs about how much the litigants value the en­
titlement at issue. But instead of being based simply on which litigant 
has the higher mean value, we show that judges should base this deci­
sion more broadly on how they believe these values to be distributed.25 
We will show that dual-chooser allocations will at times dominate 
single-chooser allocations and at other times be dominated by them. 
Dual-chooser allocations produce higher expected ex post efficiency 
when neither litigant can make a "nuanced" decision alone. Thus, 
when single-chooser rules might tend to allocate entitlements always 
to the same litigants (a decision we term "non-nuanced"), dual­
chooser rules tend to improve allocative efficiency. Whereas individ­
ual litigants, possessing only their own private information, may form 
an initial opinion about the other litigants' valuations, dual-chooser 
allocations allow the litigants effectively to exchange information and 
recognize together instances when they guessed incorrectly. Under 
these circumstances, two heads can work better than one. 
Single-chooser allocations can work more effectively, however, 
when the court has relatively good information about one litigant's 
valuation. A court should therefore delegate allocative authority only 
to litigants who have an informational advantage over the imperfectly 
informed court. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the litigant who, from 
the court's perspective, has a less speculative valuation also has less 
ability to make an efficient allocative choice. A litigant with a less 
24. In this Article, we generally distinguish between "allocation" of the entitlement at 
hand and "distribution" of wealth or value. 
25. Even after parties have produced evidence of their respective valuations, we imagine 
that courts will still have residual doubts about their true valuations. Some of these doubts 
may stem from inevitable uncertainties about the future (e.g., will the factory's new machine 
work?), while other doubts may simply result from the litigants' strategic incentive to mis­
represent their valuations (e.g., "I really value this land because my dog is buried here"). 
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speculative valuation has a smaller informational advantage vis-a-vis 
both the court and the litigant with damages. Consequently, single­
chooser allocations can work more effectively than dual-chooser allo­
cations because litigants who know little more than the court should 
not wield even partial control over the final destination of the entitle­
ment. When judges can determine one litigant's valuation with relative 
certainty, they should give the allocative choice only to the other liti­
gant. We will therefore show that the selection between the two 
single-chooser allocations tends to turn not on which litigant's valua­
tion has a higher mean, but rather on which litigant's valuation has, 
from the judge's perspective, a higher variance. 
Before proceeding, however, we want to emphasize four qualifica­
tions to our option approach concerning numerosity, autarky, inten­
tionality, and value correlation. First, we model disputes between only 
two litigants. Many nuisance examples, however, concern a single 
source whose pollution adversely affects multiple parties (a la Boomer 
or Spur).26 Nevertheless, scores of nuisance cases centrally revolve 
around a dispute between only two people.27 Moreover, we can model 
even multiple-plaintiff cases in a bilateral fashion if they involve a suf­
ficiently uniform plaintiff class. More fundamentally, our models as­
sume that only litigants contend for the role of highest entitlement 
valuer. Our option approach powerfully analyzes what economists call 
"bilateral monopoly,"28 but in many circumstances third parties will 
want to enter the notional bidding to possess the entitlement. 
Second, our analysis investigates the allocative efficiency of differ­
ent liability rules in the absence of bargaining (that is, under condi­
tions of "autarky"). This is a restrictive assumption because we should 
expect that the litigants will bargain in the shadow of the law in many 
instances. Still, our autarky assumption is supported by recent empiri­
cism suggesting that real world nuisance disputants almost never bar­
gain after courts render judgment.29 Moreover, as argued by Louis 
26. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. , 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970); Spur Indus., Inc. 
v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). James Krier and Stewart Schwab 
provided the best modern discussion of how courts should respond to numerosity problems 
in choosing among liability rules. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7. 
27. See, e.g. , Copart Indus. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977) 
(pollution from ConEd plant disrupted adjacent new car preparation business); Estancias 
Dallas Corp. v. Shultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973) (air conditioner noise reduced 
value of single adjacent residence). The class of cases dealing with visual nuisances in par­
ticular tends to involve a single plaintiff and a single defendant. See, e.g., Fontainebleau 
Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 1 14 So.2d 357 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959) (hotel addi· 
tion obstructed view of adjacent hotel); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 198 P.2d 
847 (Or. 1948) (light from night-time dog track interfered with adjacent drive-in movie). 
28. Rose characteristically hits the nail on the head when she explains that: "Ayres (is) 
interested in situations in which two parties are stuck with each other, 'thin' markets instead 
of 'thick' ones. Neighboring landowners seem to fit that bill." Rose, supra note 9, at 2183. 
29. See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A 
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1999). 
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Kaplow and Steve Shaven, there are reasons to expect that the relative 
efficiency of different liability regimes when bargaining is not possible 
will tend to persist when bargaining is possible.30 
Third, the option model primarily concerns circumstances of inten­
tional taking. While this often (if not usually) describes nuisance dis­
putes, courts often (if not usually) apply liability rules in circumstances 
of negligent taking. Finally, we assume that the litigants' valuations do 
not correlate - meaning that an unusually high entitlement valuation 
for the plaintiff does not entail an unusually high entitlement valua­
tion for the defendant. This often occurs in nuisance suits where the 
economic benefit to the polluter is orthogonal to the noneconomic 
detriment to the resident.31 
Admittedly, these restrictive assumptions limit the applicability of 
our analysis. But as stressed below,32 our assumptions fit the stylized 
facts in a rich set of circumstances. While to keep faith with Calabresi 
and Melamed we highlight nuisance examples, we believe that con­
tractual disputes provide an even larger class where our analysis ob­
tains. Liability rules (expectation damages) also traditionally protect 
contractual entitlements; the decision to breach (in other words, to 
take the promisee's entitlement) is often intentional; and contractual 
disputes are often unavoidably bilateral.33 For example, once Epstein 
agrees to cut Rose's hair, Rose is the only one with whom Epstein can 
bargain if he wants to buy back his promise.34 Although our Article 
does not provide a view of the entire legal "cathedral," the problem of 
how imperfectly informed courts should resolve bilateral disputes over 
intentional takings constitutes much more than a theoretical curiosa. 
The Article is divided into four parts. Parts I and II analyze single­
and dual-chooser allocations, respectively. These Parts derive the op-
30. See A Reply to Ayres and Talley, supra note 19, at 228-29. The persistence conjecture 
predicts that a liability rule that has a nonconsensual efficiency advantage under conditions 
of autarky (i.e., high bargaining costs) will continue under the conditions of low bargaining 
costs. According to Kaplow and Shaven, headstarts from nonconsensual efficiency will tend 
to persist when bargaining becomes possible. Id. While not denying a persistence effect, 
however, we believe that different liability rules themselves can induce different types of 
information disclosure and thereby affect the relative efficiency of rules independent of the 
autarkic or nonconsensual effect on allocative efficiency. See Consensual and Nonconsensual 
Advantages, supra note 19. 
31. With regard to visual nuisances, however, correlated valuations occur more fre­
quently. For example, new structures often derive much of their value from the good views 
they obstruct. See, e.g., Fontainebleau Hotel, 114 So. 2d at 357. 
32. See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text. 
33. Carol Rose has acutely observed that Ayres's previous option analysis has a contrac­
tual shadow as its paradigmatic example: "The contractual relationship has only a discrete 
number of parties - paradigmatically two - who . . .  are stuck with each other. " Rose, su­
pra note 9, at 2187. Rose is clearly right that contractual renegotiations often involve limited 
numbers and a bilateral monopoly. 
34. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 745. While contract renegotiations may serve as 
a paradigmatic case of bilateral monopoly, however, other examples exist. 
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timal damages for the four basic allocations and analyze the conditions 
under which a particular allocative equilibrium is most likely to be ef­
ficient. Part III then relates the dual-chooser allocations to the higher­
order allocations previously analyzed by Ayres and Balkin.35 Finally, 
Part IV investigates how the preceding results are affected when we 
relax the most restrictive assumptions of the model. The conclusion 
shows how our analysis could be applied to improve contract law and 
also how our analysis illuminates the issue of when liability rules 
should be used instead of property rules. 
I. SINGLE-CHOOSER RULES 
The original pair of liability rules analyzed by Calabresi and 
Melamed provides examples of the two fundamental single-chooser 
rules. Rule 2 represents a defendant-choice rule because the defen­
dant (Polluter) chooses who the ultimate entitlement holder will be, 
deciding whether or not to pay to pollute. Conversely, Rule 4 repre­
sents a plaintiff-choice rule because the plaintiff (Resident) chooses 
who the ultimate entitlement holder will be by deciding whether or 
not to pay to stop the pollution. 
The option recharacterization not only allows us to see the possi­
bility of two more rules, but also clarifies that liability rules (including 
"put-option" rules) do not differ merely in the way they protect an en­
titlement. We can also think of them as different ways of dividing the 
parties' claims to the entitlement. As Carol Rose has written, 
[Under a property rule regime], the entitlement holder has the whole 
meatball, so to speak, and the other party has nothing - one has prop­
erty, the other has zip. Under either of the two [call-option] liability 
rules, on the other hand, the meatball gets split: The factory has an op­
tion to pollute (or once exercised, an easement), while the homeowner 
has a property right subject to an option (or easement). For the sake of 
simplicity, I will refer to this kind of right as a PRSTO (or PRSTE) for 
"property right subject to an option (or easement). "36 
Under this view, options merely segment claims to an entitlement in a 
different way than, say, a physical or temporal partition. 
35. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9. 
36. Rose, supra note 9, at 2178-79. See generally Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1062-65 
(discussing dimensions into which courts might divide an entitlement, including put and call 
divisions). 
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Table 1. Possible "Derivative" Divisions of an Entitlement 
Division of Parties' Claims to an Entitlement 
Rule Resident's Claim Polluter's Claim 
Rule 1 Entitlement 0 
Rule2 Entitlement - Call Call 
Rule 3 0 Entitlement 
Rule4 Call Entitlement - Call 
Rule5 - Put Entitlement + Put 
Rule6 Entitlement + Put - Put 
Table 1 shows how each of the six rules divides the finite claims to 
an entitlement. Each of the rules maintains conservation of "matter,"37 
in that the sum of the Polluter's and Resident's assets and liabilities 
under each rule nets out to "Entitlement." As Rose noted, a property 
rule (such as Rule 1 or 3) gives one party everything and the other 
person "zip." But other divisions are possible. Rose saw that a 
"PRSTO" is the same as owning the entitlement subject to a liability 
(depicted by the "- Call") , in that one might face a sale forced against 
one's will for a price less than one's actual value.38 In contrast, the 
"put-option" rules (Rules 5 and 6) give initial entitlement holders eve­
rything that they would have under a property rule plus a put option. 
This necessarily implies that the opposing parties have a liability (de­
noted by "- Put") - i.e., they might have to purchase against their will 
for a price that is more than their true value. 
37. Hohfeld long ago recognized that rights are relational. See Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 
(1917); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Ju­
dicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). One's right (or entitlement) simultaneously im­
poses an obligation (or liability) on someone else. The sum of put and call options in any row 
of Table 1 equals zero, reflecting this Hohfeldian concept. 
38. Viewing liability rules as "derivatively" dividing the claims to an entitlement makes 
explicit the idea that changing the type of "protection" for an entitlement also actually 
changes the content of the entitlement. See Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the 
Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1338-39 (1986). Viewing liability rules as merely 
asset divisions also calls into question Richard Epstein's claim about the superiority of 
"property rules." Because property rules also protect both the PRSTO and the call option 
themselves, see Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 707, Epstein's claim must relate not just to 
how to protect entitlements but also to how to bundle collections of strongly protected 
claims together. 
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In terms of allocative efficiency, the four liability rules collapse 
into a choice between just two potential allocations. For any given 
damage amount and for any given combination of litigant valuations, 
Rule 2 will allocate the entitlement to the same litigant as Rule 5, and 
Rule 4 will allocate the entitlement to the same litigant as Rule 6. To 
see this, consider an entitlement dispute between two litigants - a 
plaintiff and a defendant. Let vn denote the plaintiff's valuation, and 
let v Ll denote the defendant's. We assume that both litigants know 
their own valuations but - like the court - only know the probability 
distribution of their adversary's valuation. We will refer to the prob­
ability density function of the plaintiff's and defendant's valuations, 
respectively, asfn(y) and,[d(v), and the distribution means as µn and µtJ. 
Although we will later relax the following assumptions,39 we also begin 
by assuming that the litigants' valuations are distributed independ­
ently of one another and that the transaction costs (or enmity) are suf­
ficiently high to prevent the litigants from consensually resolving their 
dispute. 
If we let the court-awarded damages equal D, then one can easily 
see40 that under Rule 2, the defendant will exercise its call option, pay 
D damages, and force the plaintiff to sell the entitlement if and only if: 
VLJ>D. 
Similarly, under Rule 5, the defendant will exercise its put option 
to force the plaintiff to purchase the entitlement at a price of D dam­
ages if and only if: 
VLJ<D.41 
These inequalities indicate that under either of the defendant­
choice rules, defendants will allocate the entitlement to themselves 
when they value it more than the damage amount and will allocate the 
entitlement to plaintiffs when they value it less. Thus, under the de­
fendant-choice rules, the defendant decides the ultimate allocation of 
the entitlement independently of the plaintiff's value. Moreover, be­
cause the defendant-choice rules produce identical allocations for any 
given damage amount and combination of litigant valuations, they 
perforce must also produce identical total payoffs.42 This means that, 
39. See discussion infra Section IV.E. 
40. An Appendix available from the authors proves this proposition. 
41. If vd = D, the defendant will be indifferent as to whether it exercises either its put or 
its call options. How the defendant acts on this indifference, however, will not affect the ex­
pected total payoffs for each litigant. The inequalities in the text implicitly assume that the 
defendant's willingness to pay equals its willingness to accept. But see Ayres, supra note 9 
and infra Section IV.E for a discussion of why this assumption might not hold. 
42. The payoffs of individual litigants merely equal their valuation of the entitlement 
should they ultimately receive it, net of any side payments that they make to or receive from 
the opposing litigants. Because the sum of the side payments must equal zero, the total pay-
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given any particular values of D, vn, and v,i, the defendant-choice rules 
(Rule 2 and 5) produce equal allocative efficiency. 
An analogous result obtains for the plaintiff-choice rules - Rules 
4 and 6. Plaintiffs will choose to allocate the entitlement to themselves 
only when their valuations of the entitlement exceed the damage 
amount. Like the defendant-choice rules, the allocative efficiency of 
Rules 4 and 6 remains equal because the physical allocation remains 
identical for any possible realization of litigants' values. 
We can now see that the judicial selection of an initial entitlement 
holder does not determine allocative efficiency. Rule 2 is equivalent to 
Rule 5, and Rule 4 is equivalent to Rule 6, even though within each of 
these pairs the initial entitlement goes to different litigants. Instead, 
allocative efficiency turns crucially on which litigant has the power to 
decide the ultimate allocation. 
Judicial selection of the initial entitlement holder does, however, 
seriously affect how the total payoff is distributed between the plain­
tiff and the defendant.43 Looking again at Table 1, defendants clearly 
fare better under the defendant-choice rule that gives them the enti­
tlement plus a put (Rule 5), than under the defendant-choice rule that 
gives them only a call (Rule 2) .44 
The foregoing suggests that judges choosing among the four liabil­
ity rules can separate allocative and distributive concerns. Selection of 
the chooser determines the allocative equilibrium, while selection of 
the initial entitlement holder determines the distributive equilibrium. 
To establish a single-chooser regime, judges must (i) select the more 
allocatively efficient chooser, (ii) select a damage amount, and (iii) se­
lect how to distribute the expected total payoff (for example, by 
choosing between Rules 2 and 5). The remainder of this Section cen­
ters on these three tasks. 
A Selecting Optimal Damages 
While selecting the optimal choosers seems logically prior to se­
lecting the optimal damages, as is often the case in game theory, we 
can more conveniently solve the model backwards by deriving first the 
offs for the plaintiff and defendant simply equal the value ascribed to the entitlement by the 
litigant who ultimately owns it. 
43. Note the parallel to the Coase Theorem. In a world without transaction costs, the 
judicial assignment of entitlements does not affect the allocative equilibrium but does affect 
the distribution of payoffs. Likewise, an autarkic model of liability rules, where high transac­
tion costs make bargaining prohibitive, can produce a similar result. Ayres and Balkin dem­
onstrated that liability rules form a kind of auction mechanism that would mimic the results 
of Coasean negotiations. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 727-29. 
44. For example, if the plaintiffs and defendants valuations are independently and uni­
formly distributed between $0 and $100, and if damages are set equal to $50 (which we later 
show is the optimal amount), then Rule 5 will yield an expected defendant payoff of $62.50, 
while Rule 2 will yield the defendant only $12.50. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 806. 
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optimal damage amount for a particular chooser and then identifying 
the more efficient chooser. Derivation of optimal damages is concep­
tually straightforward. Simply setting damages equal to the non­
chooser's expected value maximizes the allocative efficiency of single­
chooser rules.45 This means that the (allocatively) optimal damage 
amount for the defendant-choice allocations will equal: 
DA = µn, 
and the damage amounts for the plaintiff-choice allocations will equal: 
Dn = µA. 
These results apply quite generally and hold true regardless of the 
distribution of litigants' valuations, as long as the litigants' distribu­
tions are independent.46 Courts may still have legitimate concerns 
about equity and other aspects of efficiency, such as inducing adequate 
ex ante incentives to create the entitlement in question. But we will 
show that courts have a separate ability to establish almost any desired 
distributive equilibrium, and this strongly counsels in favor of damages 
that will maximize the size of the pie. 
Damages that equal nonchoosers' expected valuations maximize 
the allocative efficiency of a single-chooser allocation because they 
give the choosers an incentive to allocate entitlements to themselves 
only when their valuations surpass the mean valuations of the non­
choosers. Similarly, they give choosers an incentive to allocate enti­
tlements to nonchoosers only when their own valuations lie below the 
mean valuations of the nonchoosers. Damages equivalent to non­
choosers' mean valuations thus harness the private information of 
choosers (who are reasonably assumed to know more about their own 
valuations), and on average induces an efficient ultimate asset alloca­
tion.47 For example, if $50 represents the plaintiff's mean valuation, 
45. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15 (deriving this result with regard to call-option 
Rules 2 and 4). 
46. If the distributions do correlate, courts should still set the optimal single-chooser 
rule damages at the nonchooser's mean value - but because this mean value now occurs as 
a function of the chooser's value, optimal damages will occur at the fixed point at which 
damages equal both the nonchooser's value and the chooser's value. See discussion infra Sec­
tion IV.F. 
47. As discussed in the next section, Section LC, infra, the single-chooser rules give the 
nonchoosers a fixed expected payoff whether or not the choosers exercise their options. For 
example, under Rule 2, the plaintiffs as nonchoosers receive an expected value equal to their 
mean valuations if defendants do not exercise their call options because plaintiffs will retain 
the entitlements. On the other hand, plaintiffs will receive their expected valuations in cash 
if defendants do exercise their call options and pay damages set equal to plaintiffs' expected 
valuations. Fixing the nonchoosers' expected payoffs makes choosers the residual claimants 
of gains arising from exercise of their options. The nonchoosers resemble bondholders in 
corporate law who are fixed claimants on the assets of the firm, while choosers resemble the 
shareholders who hold the residual claims. Because choosers internalize all the marginal ef­
fects of their choice, single-chooser rules give them, like the shareholders in corporate law, 
incentives to choose the allocation that maximizes allocative efficiency, conditional on their 
superior private knowledge. 
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damages of $50 under either Rules 2 or 5 will, on average, encourage 
the defendant to take the entitlement only when such an allocation is 
efficient.48 Even when judges do not know as much as individual liti­
gants, single-chooser liability rules allow judges to exploit the private 
information of one of the litigants. 
B. Selecting the Chooser 
The second judicial task that affects allocative efficiency involves 
selection of the chooser. Although the put and call implementations of 
a given single-chooser rule produce identical allocations, nothing 
guarantees that a plaintiff-chooser rule will produce the same alloca­
tion as a defendant-chooser rule for any given damage amount and 
combination of litigant valuations. In this Section, we provide some 
guidance as to which party is the more efficient chooser - i.e., which 
chooser will produce the highest total expected payoff.49 
As a first step to identifying the more efficient chooser, courts 
must calculate the total, combined plaintiff and defendant expected 
payoff for a particular single-chooser allocation (assuming optimal 
damages). We can express these payoffs analytically as: 
"' 
E[Tota l  Payoff] = µ nc + J (qc - µ nJfc(qc )dqc 
where the subscripts c and nc refer to the chooser and nonchooser, re­
spectively. We derive the foregoing expression in an appendix,50 but 
we can also express it in more stylized terms as: 
Expected Total Payoff= nonchooser's mean + chooser's call. (A) 
Intuitively, the chooser has the power to allocate the entitlement to 
the nonchooser (in which case the total payoff will equal the non­
chooser's) or the chooser can exercise its option of allocating the enti­
tlement to itself (in which case the total payoff will equal the non­
chooser's mean plus the expected amount by which the chooser's 
mean exceeds the damage amount (equivalent to the nonchooser's 
mean)). This option (which we label "chooser's call") of allocating the 
entitlement to itself when the chooser's privately known value exceeds 
48. Defendants under Rule 2 will choose to pollute and pay $50 only if their valuations 
exceed the plaintiffs' mean valuations; defendants under Rule 5 will forego payments of $50 
only if their valuations exceed that amount. 
49. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7 (suggesting that the smaller, less numerous party 
makes the more efficient chooser). The concept of "efficient chooser" is an autarkic analog 
to the concept of the more "efficient briber," discussed originally by Calabresi & Hischoff. 
Guido Calabresi & John T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE 
L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). 
50. Appendix, supra note 40. 
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the nonchooser's mean is the reason that liability rules systematically 
produce higher efficiency than property rules, in the absence of bar­
gaining. 
But it turns out that the expected total payoff can also be ex­
pressed as: 
Expected Total Payoff= chooser's mean + chooser's put. (B) 
Thus, we can also think of the single-chooser allocation as allowing 
the chooser to keep the entitlement (yielding a payoff on average 
equal to the chooser's mean) or to put the entitlement to the non­
chooser when the chooser's privately known value falls below the 
nonchooser's mean. 
Finance cognoscenti will recognize the equivalence of these two 
payoff expressions (A and B) as an implication of the "put-call parity 
formula," which teaches that whenever one can express a value in 
terms of an implicit call, one can also express the same value in terms 
of an implicit put.51 
When applied to both plaintiff- and defendant-choice allocations, 
these two expressions of the expected total payoff give rise to four 
equivalent comparisons for determining which litigant is the better 
chooser. The plaintiff-choice rules - Rules 4 and 6 - will operate 
more efficiently than the defendant-choice rules - Rules 2 and 5 - if 
and only if the following equivalent conditions hold: 
(i) calln(µLI) > putLl(.un); 
(ii) putn(µLI) > callLl(.un); 
(iii) µn -µLI > putA(µn) - putn(µLI); and 
(iv) calln(µLI) - callLl(.un) > µn - µLI; 
where, for example, "calln(µLI)" represents the expected value of a call 
option for a plaintiff when the exercise price of the call (reported in 
the parentheses) is equal to the defendant's mean valuation.52 Two 
points immediately merit emphasis. First, these four inequalities 
merely restate one another so that probability distributions that satisfy 
one of the inequalities must automatically satisfy the others. Second, 
51. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART c. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 557-59 (5thed. 1996) (defining put-call parity); Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 
1047 (applying put-call parity to liability rules). The put-call parity formula is often stated in 
the following form: 
Call + Exercise Price = Put + Underlying Asset. 
As applied to single-chooser rules, since the exercise price of the options is set equal to 
the nonchooser's mean value, the left-hand side of this equation equals the first expression 
(equation A) for the expected total payoff. And since the expected value of the underlying 
asset to the chooser is its mean, the right-hand side of this equation equals the second ex­
pression (equation B) for the expected total payoff. 
52. Analogously, "putn(µA)" represents the expected value of a put option for a defen­
dant when we set the exercise price of the put equal to the plaintiffs mean valuation. 
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the exercise price of the options is always set at the mean valuation of 
non-option holder (i.e. the nonchooser). This latter point is just an im­
plication of the last section's finding that optimal damages should be 
set at the nonchooser's mean value. 
The most important implication of these comparisons, which be­
comes particularly evident in the first two inequalities, is that the liti­
gant who from the court's perspective has the more speculative53 
valuation will tend to make the more efficient chooser. Again, this will 
not surprise finance cognoscenti. A central result of derivative theory 
is that options tend to be more valuable as the value of the underlying 
asset becomes more volatile. The litigant that the court perceives to 
have the more speculative value is the litigant with the greater infor­
mational advantage. 
Even though we assume the litigants' values are privately known, 
those values can be uncertain from the court's perspective. And the 
court in delegating the allocative choice should grant the allocational 
option to the litigant with the greater informational advantage. The 
litigant whose value is more difficult for the court to estimate is likely 
to be the more efficient option holder because this litigant in choosing 
whether to exercise her options indicates whether her value is likely to 
be larger than the other litigant. Even though it is strange to think of 
the option holders with privately certain but socially uncertain values, 
from the perspective of a court (or social planner) with imperfect in­
formation the social value of the option is more naturally analogous to 
the value of financial option - equaling (as shown above) to the like­
lihood that the underlying asset (the litigant's value) will exceed the 
exercise price (damages). 
Indeed, when the court must select between a litigant with a com­
monly known valuation and a litigant with a valuation known to fall 
only within a particular probability distribution, the litigant with the 
known value never constitutes the more efficient chooser. 54 This 
makes intuitive sense. Litigants with commonly known valuations 
have no additional information to bring to the decision. If courts gave 
such litigants the power to allocate the entitlement (and set damages 
equal to the more speculative mean valuation of the opposing litigant), 
litigants with known valuations would therefore always allocate enti-
53. We use the word "speculative" in a special sense. Our model assumes that each liti­
gant places a non-speculative, certain dollar value on its ownership of the entitlement while 
the court and the adversaries must speculate (via a probability distribution) about how much 
the entitlement is valued by the litigant. But in many real-world contexts, however, the liti­
gants themselves may not know precisely their own valuations. A polluter, for example, may 
also have to speculate about how much profit a polluting factory will yield in the future. We 
will later relax this assumption that litigants are perfectly informed about their own valua­
tion, see infra Section IV.E, but for now it is sufficient to say that our core qualitative results 
go through. The more efficient chooser will continue to be the litigant with the larger infor­
mational advantage. 
54. See Appendix, supra note 40. 
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tlements to themselves when their own valuations exceed their oppo­
nents' mean valuations, or would allocate entitlements to their oppo­
nents when their known valuations fall below their opponents' mean 
valuations. Thus, a court that grants allocative power to the litigant 
with the known, nonspeculative valuation also effectively selects the 
ultimate entitlement holder. If the other litigant's valuation happens 
to differ from the mean of the probability distribution, however, the 
entitlement could end up in the wrong hands as a consequence. In con­
trast, courts that grant allocative power to litigants with the specula­
tive valuations, and set damages equal to the valuations of the non­
speculative litigants, will always achieve first-best allocative efficiency. 
Because speculative litigants know when their own valuations deviate 
from the mean of their probability distributions, they can prevent what 
might otherwise become a misallocation of the ultimate entitlement. 
In other words, speculative litigants will allocate entitlements to them­
selves when they know, privately, that their valuations exceed those of 
the nonspeculative litigants, and will also know to allocate entitle­
ments to the nonspeculative litigants when their own valuations are 
lower. 
In inspecting the latter two inequalities, (iii) and (iv), listed above, 
one might initially believe that the relative mean valuations of the liti­
gants should also bear on the selection of the more efficient chooser. 
But this turns out not to be true. First, as an algebraic matter, notice 
that in the third inequality, a higher mean plaintiff valuation, relative 
to the defendant's mean, seems to increase the likelihood that the 
plaintiff will choose more efficiently. Yet, in the fourth inequality, a 
higher plaintiff mean seems to decrease the likelihood that the plaintiff 
will choose more efficiently. Both cannot prove true, because these 
inequalities are mathematically equivalent.55 As it turns out, neither 
intuition proves true because the values of the put options and call op­
tions also change in ways that offset the direct impact of any change in 
the litigants' relative mean valuations. For example, if the plaintiff's 
mean rises relative to the defendant's mean (holding constant the 
variance of both litigants' valuations) ,  both the plaintiff's call and the 
defendant's put will become more valuable. This shift in relative mean 
valuations drives both these options further "into the money."56 
55. See id. 
56. From a court's perspective, a plaintiff whose mean valuation exceeds the defendant's 
mean valuation will more likely exercise a call option because more of the plaintiff's prob­
ability distribution will exceed the call's exercise price, which equals the defendant's mean. 
Similarly, the defendant will more likely exercise a put option because more of the defen­
dant's probability distribution will fall below the put's exercise price, which equals the plain­
tiffs mean. In other words, the value of call or put options depends in part on the odds that 
the litigants will actually exercise them. The odds that litigants will exercise their options in 
turn lie in direct proportion to the odds that their own mean valuations fall above or below 
their opponents' mean valuations. 
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As a general matter, option value arises as a function of both a 
"volatility" effect and an "in the money" effect. As a result of the 
"volatility" effect, options generally increase in value when an option 
holder's valuation increases in volatility. Under the "in the money" ef­
fect, options generally increase in value when (a) a call option holder's 
valuation exceeds, or (b) a put option holder's valuation falls short of, 
the option's exercise price. In working through the four inequalities, 
however, one can see that the "in the money" effect on option value 
affects both sides of each inequality in the same manner. An increase 
in the plaintiff's mean valuation, relative to the defendant's valuation, 
increases both sides of inequality (i) and decreases both sides of ine­
quality (ii) . In inequality (i), for example, the "in the money" effect on 
the plaintiff's call exactly matches its effect on the defendant's put.57 
Consequently, a shift in relative mean valuations should not - given 
constant volatility - push a court toward either favoring or disfavor­
ing a particular litigant as the more efficient chooser. 
Courts, in selecting the more efficient chooser, should focus on the 
second moment of the distribution (the variance) , not the first mo­
ment (the mean) and select the litigant who, from the court's perspec­
tive, has a higher variance of valuation. This finding suggests that the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts is misguided in suggesting that courts 
should assign the initial entitlement in nuisance disputes to the party 
with the higher valuation. The Restatement's allocation principle 
makes eminent sense where the court merely chooses between the two 
property rules, Rule 1 and 3. The principle fails to maximize allocative 
efficiency, however, when the court contemplates a choice between 
the call-option versions of the liability rules (Rules 2 and 4). Although 
we demonstrated above that selection of the initial entitlement holder 
need not affect the ultimate allocation, this holds true only in a world 
that employs both put-option and call-option liability rules - so that 
the choice of the initial entitlement holder can be decoupled from the 
choice of the more efficient chooser. But the world contemplated by 
the Restatement does not decouple these two choices. In the Restate­
ment's world (where the only liability rules that judges award are the 
call-option versions - Rules 2 and 4), a rule that the litigant with the 
higher perceived value should be the initial entitlement holder is tan­
tamount to a rule that the litigant with the lower perceived value 
should be the chooser - via call-option Rule 2 or 4. Our model does 
not support the Restatement's position. Rather, we propose that when 
there are two litigants, the more efficient chooser will tend to be the 
57. These effects come into play in inequalities (iii) and (iv) as well. A rise in the plain­
tiff's mean relative to the defendant's mean also increases both sides of inequalities (iii) and 
(iv). In inequality (iii), for example, the left-hand side (µn -µ.i) increases, but the right-hand 
side also increases as the shift in mean causes "put.i(µn)" to increase and "putn(µ.i)" to de­
crease. 
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chooser who from the court's perspective has the greater variance of 
potential private valuation. 
From a pragmatic perspective, our two single-chooser allocations 
work together so that the court can avoid estimating speculative dam­
ages. We have suggested that courts should select as chooser the liti­
gant with the more speculative value and then set damages equal to 
the less speculative mean of the nonchooser.58 
In a less reductive model, the court's selection of the more efficient 
chooser will turn on more than just the relative volatility of valuations. 
For example, the litigants' relative levels of risk aversion might affect 
a court's selection. The variance of the choosers' expected payoffs will 
tend to be lower than the nonchoosers' because choosers have greater 
control over their destiny. 59 Thus, efficiency-minded courts, other 
things held equal, might consider higher risk aversion, as well as more 
speculative damages, as desirable qualities for a potential chooser. 
At other times, the more efficient chooser will be the party that is 
less numerous.6() If a single source of pollution harms multiple resi­
dents, it may be difficult to implement a plaintiff-choice allocation. We 
will return to this issue below when we provide a more extended dis­
cussion of how numerosity affects our analysis.61 
C. Selecting the Distribution 
The first two judicial tasks - selecting the chooser and selecting 
the damages - are sufficient to determine the allocative equilibrium 
for any particular realization of litigant valuations. That is to say, these 
two judicial decisions establish who will ultimately posses the entitle­
ment. These decisions do not, however, determine the distributive 
equilibrium. For example, a court may finally decide on a defendant­
choice rule, but it still needs to select between Rules 2 and 5 in decid­
ing how to divide the payoff pie between the litigants. In this Section, 
we show that a court can divide the expected total payoff as it likes be­
tween the two litigants - unfettered by considerations about alloca-
58. We agree with Kaplow and Shavell that the speculative nature of damages should 
not exclude them from the court's assessment, see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 728-
32, but our approach simplifies the judicial task by requiring only an assessment of the less 
speculative litigant's average valuation. 
59. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 812-13, 821 & n.81. For example, if the litigants' values 
are both uniformly distributed between $0 and $100, then a single-chooser rule will give the 
chooser a fixed amount 50% of the time and a $50 range of values the other 50% of the time, 
but the rule will give the nonchooser a fixed payoff 50% of the time and a $100 dollar range 
of values the other 50% of the time. We derive this more formally in the Appendix, supra 
note 40. 
60. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 471-72. · 
61. See discussion infra Section IV.D. 
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tive efficiency. In other words, the court can decouple questions of dis­
tribution from questions of allocation. 
Obviously, a chooser given only a call option to buy an entitlement 
will receive a lower payoff than a chooser given an entitlement already 
plus a put option. Accordingly, the put implementations of the single­
chooser allocations yield a relatively larger payoff for choosers and a 
relatively smaller payoff for nonchoosers than the call implementa­
tions of the single-chooser allocations. 
But we can go even further in characterizing the relative payoffs of 
each litigant. Interestingly, the single-chooser allocations grant the 
nonchooser an expected payoff that is independent of the entitle­
ment's ultimate allocation.62 The nonchooser's expected payoff does 
not vary with respect to the chooser's actual allocative choice. More 
specifically: 
1 )  Put implementations of  the single-chooser allocations 
fix the nonchoosers' expected payoffs at zero whether 
or not choosers exercise their put options; and 
2) Call implementations of the single-chooser allocations, 
on the other hand, fix the nonchoosers' expected pay­
offs at their mean valuations, µNe, whether or not 
choosers exercise their call options. 
To see this, first consider the put implementation of the single­
chooser allocations (where the chooser has both the entitlement and a 
put option). If the chooser does not exercise the put, the nonchooser's 
payoff is zero with certainty because the nonchooser neither receives 
the entitlement nor make a payment. Instead, the nonchooser remains 
at status quo. Alternatively, if the chooser does exercise the put, the 
nonchooser's expected payoff is zero on average because the non­
choosers must pay µNe for something that they value on average at µNe· 
62. In analyzing the distributive consequences of different rules, one must distinguish 
between two different informational perspectives. The ex ante perspective assesses the liti­
gants' expected payoffs before they acquire information about their own valuation of the 
entitlement. The interim perspective assesses the litigants' expected payoffs after they iden­
tify their own valuations but before learning the other side's valuation. From the ex ante 
perspective, the possibility of facing the other side's put option does not produce a negative 
expected payoff. Under Rule 6, a Resident may force a Polluter to purchase the right to pol­
lute, but if the court sets the price at the Polluter's expected valuation, the Polluter's ex­
pected payoff equals zero. In contrast, from the interim perspective, the possibility of facing 
to the other side's put option can produce a negative expected payoff if, for example, under 
Rule 6 a Polluter happens to have a lower than average valuation. The ex ante perspective 
also matches the perspective of the court in deciding how to divide the expected payoffs be­
tween sets of observationally equivalent litigants. This perspective may at times also bear 
relevance to the formation of efficient investment incentives, if the parties don't know their 
actualized valuation until after the court creates the entitlement. Nevertheless, the interim 
perspective will potentially drive both investment and allocation decisions in other contexts. 
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Similar reasoning shows that call implementations fix the nonchoos­
ers' expected payoff at µNc.63 
Thus, call implementations of single-chooser allocations give the 
nonchooser an expected payoff that is µNe higher than put implemen­
tations yield. And since we know that put and call implementations of 
a single-chooser allocation produce identical expected total payoffs, 
equal to µNe + ca/le, it must be true that: 
1) The chooser's expected payoff in put implementations 
equals the total expected payoff, µNe + callc; and 
2) The chooser's expected payoff in call implementations 
equals the value of a chooser's call, ca/le. 
The varying distributions of the put and the call implementations 
give policymakers more flexibility in pursuing nonallocative goals; but, 
if only two implementations existed, courts would still possess only a 
rather crudely hewn distributive instrument. Distributively minded 
lawmakers might at times prefer to sacrifice ex post allocative effi­
ciency in favor a more preferred distribution by selecting an inefficient 
chooser.64 
Fortunately, courts can radically expand the class of single-chooser 
allocations by "convexifying" the payoffs between the call and the put 
implementations. We refer to this as our convexity result. It turns out 
that the two single-chooser allocations can be implemented by not just 
four rules but by a double continuum of implementations that give 
policymakers the power of smoothly distributing the expected joint 
surplus between the litigants as they see fit.65 
The key here is to distinguish between the damages that choosers 
must pay if they allocate entitlements to themselves, which we denote 
as De, from the damages that choosers must pay if they allocate enti-
63. If a chooser exercises the call option, the nonchooser receives µNe with certainty. If a 
chooser does not exercise the call option, the nonchooser simply retains the entitlement, 
which the nonchooser values on average at µNc· 
Of course, once nonchoosers come to know their private value of the entitlement, they 
will not be indifferent about whether the chooser exercises its option or not. But the court 
(and other policy makers) will never be privy to this privately held information, so the best 
that a distributively concerned court can do is to adopt the type of implementation that 
tends, on average, to produce a preferred distribution. 
64. For example, imagine that the plaintiff is the Jess efficient chooser. Then the court, 
in making the defendant the chooser, could give the plaintiff an expected payoff of zero 
(through a defendant put implementation - Rule 5) or pn (through a defendant call imple­
mentation - Rule 4). But if the court felt that the plaintiff deserved an expected payoff 
between zero and µn, it might decide to make the plaintiff the chooser via a call implementa­
tion - so that the plaintiff's expected payoff would fall in this intermediate level 
(0 < ca/In < Jin). 
65. Other authors have suggested a proliferation of liability rules on different grounds, 
see, e.g. , Levmore, supra note 9, at 2171 (showing how liability rules could require different 
levels of negligence before taking), but, with our convexity result, we are the first to focus on 
distributive flexibility. 
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tlements to nonchoosers, which we denote as DNe· As shown in Table 
2, a call implementation of a single-chooser allocation sets De equal to 
the nonchoosers' mean, µNe, and sets DNe equal to zero. This means 
that the choosers must pay to take the entitlement nonconsensually 
but pay nothing if they leave the entitlement in the hands of the non­
choosers. In contrast, a put implementation sets De equal to zero and 
sets DNe equal to - µNe, which means that the choosers pay nothing to 
retain the entitlement but receive a payment of µNe if they put the enti­
tlement into the hands of the nonchoosers. 
We normally think of an option as requiring a monetary payment 
only if the option holder exercises the option. But when the puts and 
calls are described in terms of the amounts paid by the option holder 
contingent on either choice, we open a range of new single-chooser 
implementations that still induce the choosers to make identical allo­
cations. For example, as shown in Table 2, merely averaging the dam­
ages in the put and the call implementations creates a new implemen­
tation. This new implementation requires the choosers to pay half the 
nonchoosers' mean value when taking the entitlement but entitles the 
choosers to a payment of half the nonchoosers' mean value if they al­
locate the entitlement to the nonchoosers. We refer to this implemen­
tation as a "pay-or-be-paid" rule. This third rule induces identical allo­
cations as the put and the call implementations. For example, instead 
of asking the plaintiff Residents (under Spur-like application of Rule 
4) whether they are willing to pay one million dollars to enjoin the de­
fendants' pollution, a "pay-or-be-paid" rule might ask the plaintiff to 
elect whether she prefers to pay half a million dollars to stop pollution 
or receive half a million dollars from deferidant to accept continued 
pollution. In either case, the choosers will only allocate the entitle­
ment to themselves if their private value is greater than the nonchoos­
ers' mean value because self-allocation requires the choosers to incur 
a direct cost of half the nonchoosers' mean value and an opportunity 
cost of half the nonchoosers' value, for a sum total in this case of a mil­
lion dollars.66 Indeed, any implementation with damages such that: 
De - DNe = µNe, 
where the damages choosers pay for taking the entitlement less the 
damages choosers receive for handing over the entitlement equals the 
mean of the nonchoosers, will produce an identical allocation. 
66. Opportunity cost corresponds to "the price that you pay for things that you might 
have done." Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or 
Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 688 n.19 (1990) (quoting BILLY 
JOEL, Only the Good Die Young, on THE STRANGER (Columbia Records 1977)). 
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Table 2. Expanding the Class of Single-Chooser Implementations 
Damages Expected Payoff 
Implementation De DNC 
Call fl Ne 0 
Put 0 - µNC 
"Pay-or-Be-Paid" flNd2 - µNJ2 
"Pay-or-Pay" flNc + callc ca Ile 
Alpha 
a (µNe +  callc) a (flNc + callc) - flNc (for all 0 ::: a ::: 1 )  
Chooser 
ca Ile 
callc + flNc 
ca Ile + (µNJ2) 
0 
(1 - a) (flNc + callc) 
Nonchooser 
flNc 
0 
flNcJ2 
Calle +flNc 
a (µNe +  callc) 
One can also create implementations that produce even more lop­
sided distributions than either the put or the call implementations 
without undermining the choosers' incentive to make the efficient 
choice. For example, Table 1 shows that when the damages choosers 
pay to take the entitlement, De, equals the nonchoosers' mean valua­
tion plus a call price, µNe + calle, and the payment that the choosers re­
ceive for handing over the entitlement, DNe, equals the call price, calle, 
a court can restrict the choosers to a zero expected payoff. The court 
can thus give the entire expected total payoff to the nonchoosers.67 We 
call this a "pay-or-pay" rule because the choosers must pay the non­
choosers regardless of whether they allocate the entitlement to them­
selves or to the nonchoosers; allocating to the nonchoosers merely re­
duces the amount that the choosers must pay. For example, rather 
than ask Polluters under Rule 2 whether they will pay one million dol­
lars for the right to pollute, a pay-or-pay rule might ask them to 
choose between paying $1.2 million for the right to pollute or paying 
$0.2 million to forego polluting. As with the foregoing pay-or-be-paid 
rule, choosers (absent wealth and framing effects)68 will under either 
rule allocate the entitlement to themselves only if their private valua­
tions exceed the nonchoosers' mean valuations. 
67. To verify this result, just consider the nonchooser's expected payoff. If the chooser 
keeps the entitlement, the nonchooser receives µNe + ca/le with certainty; and if the chooser 
allocates the entitlement to the nonchooser, the nonchooser receives ca/le and retains the 
entitlement, which on average it values at µNe· 
68. See discussion infra Section IV.E. 
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The put and the pay-or-pay implementations are of particular in­
terest because they give these alternatives (while maintaining the 
single-chooser rule's allocative efficiency) that allow judges to allocate 
all of the expected value to either litigant. The put implementation 
gives the entire expected payoff to the chooser, while the pay-or-pay 
gives the entire expected payoff to the nonchooser.69 In the absence of 
bargaining, the property rules, Rules 1 and 3, also allocate entire pay­
offs to one litigant or the other,70 but the distributively extreme liabil­
ity rules, the put and pay-or-pay implementations, systematically 
dominate their property rule counterparts because they produce larger 
expected total payoffs. 
By creating convex combinations of the two different types of 
damages under these two distributively extreme implementations of 
the single-chooser allocations, courts gain the ability to adopt any in­
termediate division of the expected total payoff. As shown in the row 
labeled "alpha" in Table 2, setting 
De = a (µNe + ca/le), and 
DNc = a (µNe + ca/le) - µNe, 
the court effectively distributes a fraction a of the expected total pay­
off to the nonchooser and the remaining fraction, 1 - a, to the chooser. 
Thus, by choosing the number a between zero and one, this "alpha" 
implementation gives the court unfettered flexibility in dividing the 
pie between the litigants, without undermining the chooser's incen­
tives to maximize the pie's size. For example, when a equals 0.9, the 
court can distribute ninety percent of the expected total payoff to the 
nonchooser and only ten percent to the chooser while still encouraging 
the chooser to allocate the entitlement to the litigant with the higher 
valuation. This alpha class includes both pay-or-be-paid rules (in 
which a takes on low values), and pay-or-pay rules (in which a takes 
on sufficiently higher values) .  
The reader will no doubt have realized that these new-fangled 
pay-or-be-paid and pay-or-pay distributive rules are identical to rules 
in which the court simply implements a traditional call-option rule -
but in addition requires a lump-sum payment between the litigants re­
gardless of what allocation the chooser made. Under this reconceptu­
alization, the court would set two prices - an allocative price (DA), 
which would determine the amount the chooser would pay if it allo­
cated the entitlement to itself, and a distributive price (DD), which 
would determine the amount the chooser would pay (or be paid if DD 
was negative) regardless of its allocative choice. While these alterna­
tive implementations are mathematically equivalent, we conjecture 
69. Courts can effect even more lopsided distributions by shifting the De and DNc dam­
ages amounts up above the pay-or-pay or down below the put amounts. 
70. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1062-65; Rose, supra note 9, at 2178-79. 
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that bundling the allocative and distribute prices together into discrete 
rules such as the pay-or-be-paid rule will be less jarring to judges than 
an explicitly separate distributive lump sum amount.7 1 Indeed, even 
readers who recognized this lump sum addition to the traditional call 
option liability rule probably did not recognize that the put-option 
rules are mathematically nothing more than call-option rules in which 
courts set Do equal to - µNc.72 The very novelty of the put-option im­
plementations suggests that the foregoing analysis has not always been 
obvious to legal scholars. Indeed, one of the payoffs of this Article is 
to show that put-option rules are not esoterica but merely implemen­
tations of call-option rules with a lump-sum side payment. 
In the past, courts may have been tempted to accommodate dis­
tributive considerations by simply raising the call-option exercise price 
of the traditional liability rule. Courts could accomplish this, for ex­
ample, by requiring an Atlantic Cement to pay more than the Resi­
dents' expected valuation to acquire a pollution right.73 The foregoing 
analysis shows that such an award would needlessly sacrifice allocative 
efficiency by inducing Atlantic Cement to take too infrequently on the 
altar of equity. In this example, a better way to increase the Residents' 
payoff would be to institute a pay-or-pay rule - which would simulta­
neously increase the amount that Atlantic Cement would pay even if it 
chose not to pollute (DNc) and increase the price it must pay if it chose 
to pollute (De). More generally, we have shown that it is misguided for 
courts to deviate from setting damages at the nonchooser's mean 
valuation as a way to improve distributive equity. 
None of these implementations - including the infinity of alpha 
implementations - affect the variance of expected payoff for either 
the chooser or the nonchooser. Accordingly, the adoption of any one 
71 .  There is a sense, of course, in which the court in setting both De and DNe is setting 
two prices. Other law and economic scholars have considered decoupling the amount the 
defendant pays from the amount the plaintiff receives. See A. Mitchell Polinsky and 
Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. 
ECON. 562 (1991). The type of decoupling this Article proposes, however, differs because 
the side payments from the litigants always net to zero. 
72. Rule 6, for example, uses a put-option rule that gives the plaintiff both the initial 
entitlement and the option to put the entitlement to the defendant at a price equal to defen­
dant's mean valuation. But the same allocation and distribution could be implemented by a 
Spur-like Rule 4 (which gives the initial entitlement to the defendant but gives the plaintiff a 
call option to buy at the defendant's mean valuation) if in addition the court also ordered the 
defendant to pay her mean valuation to the plaintiff regardless of the plaintiff's choice (i.e., 
Do = - µNe). Under the call implementation with the lump-sum mean side payment, plaintiffs 
would end up with (i) the entitlement and no net dollar transfer if they allocate the entitle­
ment to themselves, or (ii) a net dollar transfer equaling the defendant's mean value, if 
plaintiffs allocate the entitlement to the defendant. This, of course, yields the same outcome 
as under the put implementation. 
73. Cf Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). At some 
point, however, an additional increase in the exercise price of the defendant's call would not 
increase the plaintiff's expected payoff because the defendant would never agree to pay such 
a price. 
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of the distributive implementations within a particular single-chooser 
allocation would not affect a court's selection of a chooser on the basis 
of relative risk aversion. A court's selection of the more efficient 
chooser - whether it be motivated by considerations of numerosity, 
variance, or risk aversion - is independent of the court's distributive 
choice. 
This convexity result allows lawmakers to decouple distributive 
concerns from ex post allocative efficiency concerns and thus frees 
courts to divide the expected total payoff in order to further either eq­
uity or to generate better ex ante investment incentives. From an 
equity perspective, courts might, for example, fine-tune the extent to 
which it rewards a plaintiff's coming-to-a-nuisance claim with an ex­
pected payoff. The option perspective also provides courts with an 
amount to distribute that exceeds even the mean valuation of the 
higher valuing party. Single-chooser allocations produce an expected 
total payoff that systematically exceeds the expected valuation of ei­
ther party, and a court concerned about matters of equity can now 
make a more explicit decision about which litigant has a stronger equi­
table claim to this option value. 
From an efficiency perspective, a court's division of the expected 
total payoff can exert important effects on the parties' ex ante invest­
ment incentives. If lawmakers place a high value on the Residents' in­
centives to invest in their land, a grant of the entire payoff in the form 
of an initial entitlement plus a put option will give them a much 
stronger incentive to invest than merely giving them a call.74 Thus, ex­
panding the class of plaintiff-chooser and defendant-chooser alloca­
tions not only allows lawmakers to better accommodate competing 
equity and efficiency concerns, but can also help lawmakers better ac­
commodate competing efficiency concerns - that is, the concern with 
ex ante investment efficiency and the concern with ex post allocative 
efficiency. 
While we have shown in our simple model that the courts distribu­
tive choice need not affect the chooser's allocative decision making, 
there is a sense in which the distributive rules may affect the non­
chooser's decision making. In some litigation contexts, the nonchooser 
may take an initial action that triggers the chooser's subsequent (put 
or call) option. For example, the next section will show that a common 
law put rule can be seen as a two-stage process: in the first stage, the 
defendant intentionally takes, thereby signaling a willingness to face 
the plaintiff's put option in the second stage. Such two-stage liability 
regimes exemplify what we call dual-chooser rules because both liti-
74. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 807; Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 733. The ex ante 
investment effects of traditional liability rules are explored by Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Prop­
erty Rights and Liability Rules: The Ex Ante View of the Cathedral, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Dec. 2001). 
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gants have an impact on the ultimate allocation. The goal of the next 
section is to analyze what damages maximize the allocative efficiency 
of such rules, and to assess the conditions under which dual-chooser 
allocations dominate (or are dominated by) single-chooser allocations. 
II. DUAL-CHOOSER RULES 
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two or more funda­
mental allocations that judges might choose in resolving disputes. We 
refer to the legal regimes that give rise to these allocations as "dual­
chooser" rules as opposed to single-chooser rules because both liti­
gants have a potential impact on how the entitlement is allocated. As 
with the single-chooser rules, dual-chooser rules give rise to two dif­
ferent allocations. In what we call the "plaintiff-presumption dual­
chooser" allocation, either litigant can unilaterally cause the entitle­
ment to be allocated to the plaintiff. If either the plaintiff or the de­
fendant prefers that the entitlement be allocated to the plaintiff (along 
with any court-determined side-payment), then the plaintiff receives 
the entitlement. The entitlement is allocated to the defendant only if 
both litigants agree to a court-crafted trade. But because either litigant 
is sufficient to ensure a plaintiff allocation, the plaintiff-presumption 
equilibrium disproportionately favors the entitlement to the plaintiff. 
This pro-plaintiff allocation bias appears in panel (c) of Figure 3, in 
which three out of four quadrants are allocated to the plaintiff. 
Conversely, the defendant-presumption dual-chooser rule allocates 
the entitlement to the defendant unless both plaintiff and defendant 
choose to allocate the good to the plaintiff (along with the associated 
court-determined side-payment). Because either litigant can veto a 
plaintiff allocation, this type of rule disproportionately favors alloca­
tion of the entitlement to the defendant, as shown in panel (d) of Fig­
ure 3 .  
All four of these basic allocations - the two single-chooser alloca­
tions and the two dual-chooser allocations - arise from what we label 
"single-price" allocations. In these allocations, the court establishes 
both a single allocative price75 and the identity of the chooser or 
choosers, and then the court sits back and lets the chooser(s) allocate 
the entitlement. 
A number of different option interpretations give rise to these 
dual-chooser implementations. Here we examine two plaintiff­
presumption dual-chooser implementations, but transposing the iden-
75. In one sense, of course, the court sets two prices in setting both De and DNe· From an 
option perspective, however, the court sets only one relevant allocative price, the difference 
between these amounts (De - DNe). As discussed above, the court can implement the 
decoupling of allocative and distributive concerns alternatively by explicitly setting a single 
allocative price, DA, and a single distributive price, Do. See supra notes 71-72 and accompany­
ing text. 
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tity of the plaintiff and defendants can create analogous defendant­
presumption implementations. Consider the following two divisions of 
entitlements: 
TI: E + put(D11r) - put(D11r) 6.: - put(D11r) + put(D17r) (A) 
II: call(Dnr) - put(Dnr) 6.: E - call(D17r) + put(D17r) (B) 
In the first, "double-put" regime, (A), the court gives the plaintiff 
the initial entitlement plus a put option to receive a price of $Dnp, but 
subject to the defendant's put option to sell the entitlement back to 
plaintiff, also for $Dnp. This allocations allows either litigant to veto 
the transfer of the entitlement to the defendant. The plaintiff can veto 
the transfer of the entitlement by refusing to exercise its initial put, but 
even if the plaintiff exercises this put, the defendant can veto the 
transfer by putting the entitlement back to the plaintiff. We can easily 
derive the equilibrium choices, or strategies, that this allocation in­
duces. The plaintiff will put the entitlement only if: 
V11 < DrJP, 
and the defendant will put the entitlement back only if: 
VA < D11P, 
where v denotes the precise, privately known valuation of each liti­
gant, as opposed to their respective mean speculative valuations, µ. As 
illustrated in panel ( c) of Figure 3, these two conditions together mean 
that in equilibrium, the defendant will receive the entitlement if and 
only if: 
v11 < Dnp < VLJ.76 
Alternatively, under the second regime, (B), the court gives the 
plaintiff a call option to buy the defendant's initial entitlement but 
subject to the defendant's put option to sell. This allocation allows ei­
ther litigant to force a transfer of the entitlement to the plaintiff with a 
payment of $D11p from plaintiff to defendant. As with regime (A), the 
defendant will retain the entitlement if and only if: 
vu < D11p < Vii. 
This assures that the allocations of these two rules will be identical 
for any possible combination of plaintiff and defendant private valua­
tions. As with the single-chooser allocations, however, these different 
plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser implementations produce very dif-
76. The court could implement another option scheme to allow either party to veto a 
transfer of the entitlement to the defendant by: 
n: E - call(Dnr) + call(Dnr) t.: + call(Dnr) - call(Dnp). 
In the text's double-put rule, the plaintiff can in a sense offer to sell the entitlement for 
$DnP by initially putting, and the defendant can accept this offer by choosing not to put the 
entitlement back. In contrast, this footnote's double-call rule allows the defendant to offer to 
buy the entitlement by exercising its initial call option, and the plaintiff can accept this offer 
by choosing not to call the entitlement back. 
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ferent distributions. By inspecting the initial entitlement division, it is 
apparent that the plaintiff's expected payoff increases if the plaintiff 
receives the initial entitlement (and potentially receives subsequent 
payment for transfer of the entitlement) than if the plaintiff does not 
receive the initial entitlement (and can only gain it by paying a court­
determined amount).77 
At first blush, these. dual-chooser allocations seem esoteric and 
otherworldly, but as we intimated at the end of the last section, several 
common law settings already provide at least the potential for joint­
chooser allocations. For example, if Laurel intentionally encroaches 
on Hardy's land, Hardy traditionally has (in addition to damages for 
the prior encroachment) the choice of ejectment (an injunction forcing 
Laurel to remove the encroachment) or permanent damages (forcing 
Laurel to permanently purchase78 the ,encroa�hing property at a court­
determined amount).79 Instead of beginning the analysis with Hardy's 
allocative choice (of taking back the land or forcing a sale to Laurel), 
it may be more useful - at least with regard to deliberate encroach­
ment - to think of the law as implementing a dual-chooser allocation. 
From this perspective, the encroacher signals a willingness to buy 
property at a court-determined price by intentionally encroaching on 
it, and the plaintiff indicates a willingness to sell at this same court­
determined price by suing for damages instead of ejectment. More 
generally, in property law, a temporary taking or impairment of an­
other's right often has the effect of triggering a put option.80 When a 
deliberate taking, with the prospect of paying compensatory damages, 
results in a plaintiff's choice between compensation and restoration of 
the entitlement, these dual choices of the litigants implement a plain-
77. The option interpretation of these dual-chooser rules makes clear that they are con­
strained versions of what one of us has previously referred to as "second-order rules." See 
Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9. The dual-chooser rules constrain these second-order rules by 
setting the exercise price of both options to an identical amount, $D. Part III, infra, of this 
Article analyzes and compares the unconstrained analog to this constrained, dual-chooser 
version. 
78. The court may thereby force an encroacher not only to compensate the landowner 
for the temporary, past encroachment, but also to purchase a "permanent" right to encroach 
on the land in the future, even if the encroacher would actually prefer to remove the en­
croachment instead. 
79. See Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646, 647 (Pa. 1895) (granting plaintiff the choice of dam­
ages for "permanent trespass" or an injunction to remove the "offending ends of the stones," 
after finding that defendant's brick wall encroached one and three-eighths inches under­
neath the plaintiff's property). 
80. Accordingly, we can apply a similar two-stage analysis to (i) a tenant's choice to hold 
over, followed by a landlord's choice to force an additional term lease, see JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 431 (3d. ed. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 14.4 cmt. f (1977), or (ii) an intentional taking of 
chattel followed by the owner's choice of trover (i.e., compensatory damages) or replevin 
(i.e., an injunction ordering the chattel's return), see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra, at 105-
06. 
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tiff-presumption dual-chooser allocation - in that the entitlement will 
be allocated to the defendant only if both the defendant's private 
valuation surpasses, and the plaintiff's private valuation falls below, 
the expected court-awarded damages. 
Indeed, under current law, courts may have difficulty implement­
ing true plaintiff-choice, single-chooser rules that do not effectively in­
clude an element of defendant choice. Plaintiffs traditionally gain put 
options only after a defendant temporarily impairs their initial enti­
tlement. Thus, an intentional taking by the defendant effectively con­
verts such single-chooser put options into dual-chooser allocations. 
Only if the defendant takes unintentionally or if the plaintiff comes to 
a pre-existing nuisance might we have a circumstance that produces a 
true plaintiff-choice allocation.81 But our motivation for studying dual­
chooser allocations does not spring solely from their current common 
law existence - rather, we intend to show that dual-chooser rules at 
times are more allocatively efficient . than single-chooser rules and 
should accordingly be added more consciously to policymakers' tool­
kits. 
A Selecting Optimal Damages 
Damages that maximize the allocative efficiency of plaintiff­
presumption dual-chooser are those allocations such that: 
fn(vn = Dnp)E[v 6 - Dnp I ve. >  Dnp] = fe.(v e. = Dnp)E[DnP - Vn I Dnp > vn] (C) 
remembering that vn and v 6 represent the plaintiff's and defendant's 
respective valuation, fn (vn) and f6(v 6) represent the plaintiff's and de­
fendant's respective probability distribution of these valuations, and E 
represents an expectations operator.82 While this optimization equa­
tion (which economists call a "first-order condition") initially seems 
forbidding, it has a straightforward intuition. By setting damages, the 
court simultaneously determines two allocative margins: the margin on 
which the plaintiff will veto allocations of the entitlement to the de-
81. In contrast, it is usually possible to implement single chooser rules in which the de­
fendant has the sole allocative choice. For example, the defendant's choice both to com­
mence pollution and to exercise its call-option amount to a unitary decision to take the enti­
tlement and pay damages. Of course, plaintiffs often make deliberate choices about whether 
to produce the entitlement in the first place - so the plaintiff's initial investment decision 
may introduce elements of plaintiff choice into what otherwise would be a defendant 
chooser rule. 
There may, however, also be some limits on the ability of courts to vary how the payoff 
is distributed. If polluting potentially exposes the polluter to a pay-or-pay allocation, then a 
polluter who will ultimately choose not to allocate the entitlement to itself will prefer not to 
pollute in the first place. See Levmore, supra note 9, at 2168-70 (discussing impact of ex­
pected damages on litigants' initial incentive to pollute or bring suit). 
82. See Appendix, supra note 40. Solving an analogous implicit formula for D yields the 
optimal damages for the defendant-presumption dual-chooser allocation: 
fnf..vn = Dnp)E[DJp - VJ I DJP > VJ] = f,,(vJ = DJp)E[vn - DJP I Vn > D,,p]. 
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fendant, and the margin on which the defendant will veto allocations 
of the entitlement to the defendant. The court's task is to find the sin­
gle damage amount that optimally trades off these two veto margin ef­
fects. The damage amount that solves the foregoing equation accom­
plishes precisely this task. 
A small increase in the size of Dnp, from D' to D", for example, has 
the simultaneous effect of (i) decreasing the plaintiff's willingness to 
veto allocations to the defendant, and (ii) increasing the defendant's 
willingness to veto allocations to the defendant.83 The left-hand side of 
the optimization equation describes the marginal impact on allocative 
efficiency of decreases in the plaintiff's willingness to veto. It repre­
sents the changed likelihood that the plaintiff will veto,fn(_Dnp), multi­
plied by the consequent expected change in allocative efficiency, 
E[vLJ - Dnp I VLJ > Dnp]. The right-hand side of the equation analogously 
represents the marginal impact on allocative efficiency of increasing 
the defendant's willingness to veto defendant allocations. Solving the 
equation for Dnp therefore yields the damage amount that equates and 
thereby balances the marginal effects on allocative efficiency from the 
simultaneous increases in both the plaintiff's willingness to accept and 
the defendant's willingness to veto allocation of the entitlement to the 
defendant. 
In practice, the optimal damage amount will often represent a 
weighted average of the plaintiff's and the defendant's mean valua­
tions. This makes some intuitive sense when one remembers that set­
ting damages equal to the litigants' mean valuations optimizes effi­
ciency whenever a single litigant can veto and thereby block the 
allocation of an entitlement. It should therefore not be surprising that 
the optimal joint veto amount will normally lie somewhere between 
the optimal damage amounts of the two single-chooser allocations. 
Moreover, while it outstrips the quality of the evidence, as well as ju­
dicial temperament and training, to ask judges to solve explicitly the 
foregoing equation for an optimal D ,  the idea that optimal plaintiff­
presumption dual-chooser damages will often be close to the average 
of the litigants' mean valuations provides some pragmatic guidance in 
setting damages. 84 
83. With higher damage amounts, the plaintiff becomes less likely to veto a defendant 
allocation because the plaintiff becomes more willing to allocate the entitlement to the de­
fendant as long as: 
V{/ <  Dflp. 
Higher damage amounts increase the defendant's likelihood of vetoing defendant alloca­
tions because they makes it less likely that: 
Dflp < v�. 
84. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 827 (discussing possibility of a "joint-veto" regime with 
damages that "will approximately split the difference between the Resident's and the Pol­
luter's mean valuations"). 
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We can, however, conjure up examples where the optimal dual­
chooser damages do not lie between the mean valuations of the liti­
gants. For example, if the plaintiff's valuation is uniformly distributed 
between $25 and $75 and the defendant's is uniformly distributed be­
tween $0 and $100, the optimal plaintiff-presumption damages equal 
$62.50, an amount higher than the litigants' mean valuation of $50.85 
This happens because the plaintiff is a systematically poorer chooser 
than the defendant. Because the plaintiff's valuation in this example 
varies less than the defendant's valuation, the defendant has a greater 
informational advantage, relative to the court, than the plaintiff. This 
means that a defendant single-chooser allocation would be more effi­
cient than a plaintiff single-chooser allocation in this case. The defen­
dant's greater informational advantage also affects how an efficiency­
minded court would distribute allocative power between the litigants 
in tailoring a dual-chooser rule. When the plaintiff has less private in­
formation and thus makes a relatively poor chooser, damage amounts 
that exceed both parties' mean valuations lower the odds that the 
plaintiff will veto a defendant allocation. Erring on the side of more 
frequent defendant vetoes yields greater allocative efficiency than 
more frequent plaintiff vetoes because the defendant makes more in­
formed, and therefore more efficient, choices than does the plaintiff. 
We will return to this example again when we compare the four basic 
allocations. As we will see, the same effect that causes dual-chooser 
damages to take on extreme, and seemingly counterintuitive, values 
also causes single-chooser allocations to be more efficient than dual­
chooser allocations. 
B. Selecting the Distribution 
Before moving on to compare the relative allocative efficiency of 
the different rules, we pause here to comment on payoff distribution 
under the dual-chooser allocations. As with the single-chooser alloca­
tions, an infinity of dual-chooser implementations permits courts to 
vary the distribution of payoffs among the individual litigants while 
leaving allocative efficiency unaffected. Just as we had earlier distin­
guished between damages paid for self-allocation of an entitlement, 
De, and damages paid for allocation to the nonchooser, DNc, under the 
plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser rules one can also distinguish be­
tween: 
85. Applying our earlier equation (C) for optimal dual-chooser damages, see supra note 
82 and accompanying text, to the particular uniform distributions in this example implies 
that optimal damages will solve the following equation: 
I 
J
IOO I I ro I 
50 o (v8 - D) I OO dv8 =  I OO h/D- vn ) 50 dvn ,  
which, when solved, yields D = $62.50. 
40 
DNo Veto = 
Dveto 
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the price the defendant pays the plaintiff if 
neither litigant vetoes the allocation of the en­
titlement to the defendant; and, 
the price the defendant pays the plaintiff if one of 
the litigants vetoes a defendant allocation so that 
the entitlement goes to the plaintiff. 
If we label as D17p the damage amount that solves the foregoing op­
timization equation (C), then a continuum of allocatively identical 
plaintiff-presumption rules emerges that take the form: 
DNo Veto - Dvero = D17p. 
For example, if the allocatively optimal damages equal $50, then a 
dual-chooser allocation that required the defendant to pay $25 to the 
plaintiff when the entitlement is allocated to the defendant (DNo Veto = 
$25), and required the plaintiff to pay $25 to the defendant when the 
entitlement is allocated to the plaintiff (Dveto = -$25) ,  would produce 
exactly the same allocative choices by the litigants as a simpler rule 
that required a payment of $50 by the defendant if the parties jointly 
chose to allocate the entitlement to the defendant. In either case, the 
plaintiff would choose to allocate the entitlement to the defendant 
only if the plaintiff valued it less than $50, and the defendant would 
choose to allocate the entitlement to itself only if the defendant valued 
it more than $50. 
Thus, as before, a lock-step increase or decrease in DNo veto and 
Dvero does not affect the litigants' allocative choice and a fortiori the 
allocative efficiency. Rather, such changes have the effect of increas­
ing or decreasing the plaintiff's average share of the expected total 
payoff. Courts can therefore freely distribute the total expected payoff 
between the litigants as they see fit. Although computationally more 
difficult, a dual chooser analog to the "alpha" implementations of the 
single-chooser allocations would also allow courts to allot a fraction a 
of the expected joint payoffs to the plaintiff and a fraction (1 - a) to 
the defendant.86 
86 . For example, assume that D,,r equals the optimal damages for the plaintiff­
presumption dual-chooser allocation. Assume further that under the straightforward 
"double-put" regime (discussed supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text, in which 
DNo Veto = D,11, and Dveto = 0), the expected payoffs for the plaintiff and the defendant equal 
EP,1 and EP,,, respectively. One can then show that an implementation that sets 
DNo Veto = Drrr' - EPrr and Dveto = - EP,, would distribute the ·entire joint expected payoff to the 
defendant; and an implementation that sets DNa Veto = D11r + EPJ and Dvero = EP,, would dis­
tribute the entire joint expected payoff to the plaintiff. More generally, an implementation 
that sets DNoVeto = D,,r - aEP11 + (/ - a) EP,, and Dveto = - aEPrr + (/ - a)EP,, would distribute a 
fraction a of the joint expected payoff to the plaintiff and a fraction (/ - a) to the defendant. 
October 2001) Optimal Delegation and Decoupling 41 
C. Selecting the Choosers 
As an initial task in identifying the more efficient chooser, a court 
must determine which of the two dual-chooser allocations is more effi­
cient, the plaintiff-presumption allocation or the defendant­
presumption allocation. Graphically, this comes down to determining 
whether to apportion the quadrants II and III (of Figure 4 below) to 
the plaintiff or to the defendant. Both dual-chooser allocations appor­
tion the first quadrant to the defendant and the fourth quadrant to the 
plaintiff. But the plaintiff-presumption regime apportions both of the 
remaining quadrants, II and III, to the plaintiff, while the defendant­
presumption regime apportions the off-diagonal quadrants to the de­
fendant.87 
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It turns out that the plaintiff-presumption allocation tends to be 
more efficient than the defendant-presumption equilibrium when: 
µn > µLJ.88 
For example, imagine that the defendant's valuation is uniformly 
distributed between $0 and $100, and that the plaintiff's valuation is 
uniformly distributed between $80 and $180. The optimal damages for 
either a plaintiff-presumption or a defendant-presumption allocation 
will equal $90, the average of the litigants' mean valuations.89 But, as 
87. Besides this "off-diagonal" effect, the two types of dual-chooser rules can produce 
different optimal damages, which might affect which equilibrium generates more allocative 
efficiency. 
88. For example, when the litigants' valuations are uniformly distributed, a higher plain­
tiff mean implies that the plaintiff-presumption equilibrium will produce a higher expected 
joint payoff than the defendant-presumption equilibrium. 
89. Applying our earlier equation (C) for optimal dual-chooser damages, see supra text 
accompanying note 82, to the particular uniform distributions in this example implies that 
optimal damages will solve the following equation: 
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Figure 5 shows, a plaintiff-presumption allocation is much more effi­
cient than a defendant-presumption allocation because it apportions 
the off-diagonal quadrants (II and III) to the plaintiff. Figure 5 shows 
that much more of the probability mass in quadrants II and III lies be­
low the first-best forty-five degree line than above it.90 In other words, 
the plaintiff's valuation will probably exceed the defendant's valuation 
in these quadrants. This simple example provides intuitive support for 
the claim that the plaintiff-presumption allocation will tend to domi­
nate the defendant-presumption equilibrium when the plaintiff's mean 
is higher than the defendant's. The converse also tends to hold true. 
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which when solved yields D = $90.00. 
90. The forty-five degree diagonal line represents the first-best allocation, possible only 
with perfect information. 
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Appreciating the theoretical and practical possibility of rules par­
tially rehabilitates the Restatement's focus on the parties' relative 
valuations. Although the relative size of the litigants' mean valuations 
does not significantly bear on the selection between the two single­
chooser allocations, it does bear not only on the selection between 
dual-chooser allocations, but also (as we are about to see) on the se­
lection between dual- and single-chooser allocations themselves. 
D. Selecting Among the Four Foundational Single-Price Allocations 
To summarize our results thus far, we have shown that four basic 
allocations exist - two single-chooser and two dual-chooser alloca­
tions. We have derived the optimal damages for each and shown that 
courts can divide the expected total payoff between the litigants as it 
wishes without affecting the allocative efficiency of any of the four 
allocations. Finally, we have shown that under a single-chooser rule, 
courts should appoint as chooser the litigant with the more speculative 
valuation. Under a dual-chooser rule, on the other hand, courts should 
allow either party to veto allocations to the party with the lower mean. 
We can restate these last two results more mathematically as fol­
lows: 
( 1  ') when an >  CT,j, E[TP]n > E[TP].1, and 
(2') when µn > µ.1, E[TP] nP > E[TP] L1P, 
where E[TP] represents the expected total payoff, and the subscripts 
11, L1, IlP, and L1P refer to the plaintiff-choice, defendant-choice, 
plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser and defendant-presumption dual­
chooser allocations, respectively. In the following discussion, we refer 
to the first result as the "different variance" effect and to the second 
result as the "different mean" effect. 
Our final task is to try to identify which of the four allocations is 
likely to maximize allocative efficiency. In other words, we need to 
assess when the better single-chooser allocation dominates (or is 
dominated by) the better dual-chooser allocation. As an initial matter, 
there are many circumstances in which the four basic equilibria will be 
allocatively equivalent. For example, if the litigants have identical and 
symmetric probability distributions of valuation, the four classes of 
rules will generate identical damages and identical expected total pay­
offs. Under such circumstances, apportionment of quadrants II and III 
to either litigant will be equally efficient, and so the four different 
permutations of quadrant allocations generated by the four basic allo­
cations will be equivalent. 
But it turns out for more general probability distributions that the 
dual-chooser allocations are sometimes better than, and at other times 
inferior to, single-chooser allocations. Two heads can be better than 
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one; but sometimes one head - that is, a single allocative chooser -
can be better than two. 
The optimal allocation will turn on the relative size of the 
different-mean and different-variance effects discussed above. When 
the difference in valuation means is large relative to the difference in 
valuation variances, a dual-chooser rule that allows either party to 
veto an allocation to the lower valuing litigant will tend to dominate 
the other three basic allocations. In contrast, when the difference in 
valuation variances is large relative to the difference in valuation 
means, a single-chooser rule that allows the higher variance litigant to 
allocate the entitlement will tend to dominate the other three basic al­
locations.91 
Put more intuitively, two choosers will tend to be better than one 
when the litigants have relatively different means but relatively similar 
variances. A sufficiently wide divergence in the litigants' means un­
dermines the efficiency of a single-chooser rule because no single­
chooser has sufficient information to make a nuanced allocation. By 
"nuanced allocation," we mean nothing more than an equilibrium in 
which the chooser makes more refined decisions about who will be al­
located the entitlement - at times allocating the entitlement to each 
litigant. As the different-mean effect comes to dominate the different­
variance effect, however, single choosers will tend to make "less­
nuanced" decisions - allocating the entitlement to the same litigant 
all the time. Under such conditions, a dual-chooser rule can increase 
allocative efficiency, because the litigants' combined allocative power 
can identify when a given allocation should occur even when single 
choosers would not have chosen it. 
For example, consider again a defendant whose value is uniformly 
distributed between $0 and $100 and a plaintiff whose value is uni­
formly distributed between $80 and $180, as in Figure 5 .  Notice that 
we have intentionally constructed the example so that the different­
mean effect will dominate the different-variance effect. The variances 
of the litigants' values match (rl n = rl.1 = $833.33), but their means dif­
fer (µn = $130 > µ.-J = $50). Our prior analysis indicated that the equal 
variances would tend to make the plaintiff-choice rule allocatively 
equivalent to the defendant-choice rule. Moreover, the unequal mean 
valuations tend to favor the plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser alloca-
91. For example, for uncorrelated, uniform distributions it can be shown that when 
there is no mean difference but only a variance difference, the better single-chooser rule 
dominates the better dual-chooser rule and hence the better single-chooser rule is globally 
optimal (within the class of single-price liability rules). Conversely, when there is no variance 
difference, but only a mean difference, it can be shown that the better dual-chooser rule 
dominates the better single-chooser rule and hence the better dual-chooser rule is globally 
optimal. 
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tion over the defendant-presumption dual-chooser allocation.92 But 
what still needs to be determined is whether the plaintiff-presumption 
dual-chooser allocation dominates either of the equivalent single­
chooser allocations. 
As suggested above, it does, and here's why. Either of the single­
chooser allocations produces a non-nuanced decision - allocating the 
entitlement exclusively to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff acts as chooser 
and damages equal the defendant's mean of $50, then the plaintiff will 
always allocate the entitlement to itself.93 Conversely, if the defendant 
acts as chooser and damages equal the plaintiff's mean valuation of 
$130, the defendant will never allocate the entitlement to itself.94 
When the difference in mean valuations becomes sufficiently large, 
neither chooser possesses information sufficient to make a nuanced 
allocation. 
A dual-chooser allocation, by contrast, improves allocative effi­
ciency because the joint choice of the litigants allows the entitlement 
to go at times to the defendant when the defendant values the entitle­
ment more. The dual-chooser allocation allows the low mean litigant 
(here, the defendant) to end up with the entitlement when it has an 
unusually high value and when the high mean litigant (the plaintiff) 
has an unusually low value. As discussed above,95 the optimal dual­
chooser damages for this example equal $90. With a single-chooser al­
location, a damage amount of $90 would not produce an efficient out­
come on average because such an amount would cause the lone 
chooser to allocate the entitlement inefficiently to the defendant too 
often. The plaintiff-presumption allocation, however, can efficiently 
operate with a damage level of $90 because the entitlement will go to 
the defendant only when the defendant's valuation exceeds $90 and 
the plaintiff's valuation falls short of $90. Figure 5 depicts this more 
nuanced allocation. When both litigants have a say in the ultimate 
allocation, the expected total payoff increases.96 
92. The example can also be easily converted to show how a defendant-presumption 
rule can dominate any of the other three foundational allocations by simply reversing the 
identity of the plaintiff and defendant probability distributions - so that the plaintiff's value 
would be distributed uniformly between $0 and $100, and the defendant's value between $80 
and $180. 
93. This happens because the plaintiff's valuation ranges from $80 to $180 and thus will 
always exceed the $50 damage payment for allocating the entitlement to the defendant. 
94. Likewise, this happens because the defendant's valuation ranges from $0 to $100 and 
thus the $130 damage payment for allocation to the plaintiff would always exceed the defen­
dant's valuation. 
95. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
96. Expected joint profits under a plaintiff-presumption allocation equal $130.10, as 
compared to single-chooser joint profits of $130.00. When the single-chooser rules allocate 
the entitlement exclusively to one litigant, the dual-chooser rules can never produce a lower 
expected total payoff because we can set dual-chooser damages to produce an always non-
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When the litigants' estimated mean valuations differ greatly, the 
superiority of the dual-chooser allocations resolves an embarrassing 
disconnect between our liability rule analysis above and cases like 
Boomer. In Boomer, the court estimated that the Polluter valued the 
right to pollute much more than the Residents valued the right to no 
pollution. 97 Simple single-chooser rules of either the call or put 
varieties (Rules 2, 4, 5 and 6) are allocatively embarrassing because 
setting the damages equal to the nonchooser's mean would produce 
non-nuanced equilibria that are allocatively indistinguishable from 
simply giving the polluter a property-rule interest in the entitlement 
(Rule 3). Boomer-like residents confronting an allocative price set 
equal to the polluter's high mean value would never allocate the enti­
tlement to themselves, and an Atlantic Cement-like polluter confront­
ing an allocative price set equal to the residents' low mean value 
would never fail to allocate the entitlement to itself. When the liti­
gants' means vary greatly, single-chooser rules are allocatively a non­
event.98 In contrast, the dual-chooser rules intentionally seek out a 
damage amount between the litigants' mean valuations - where the 
litigants' probability distributions overlap - so as to produce more ef­
ficient, nuanced allocations. Unlike the single-chooser allocations, 
dual-chooser allocations do not force the court to set damages only at 
the plaintiff's or the defendant's mean valuation.99 
Dual-chooser allocations, however, are not always preferable. 
When the litigants have relatively divergent variances but similar 
nuanced equilibrium. For example, if the plaintiff-presumption damages were set at $130, 
then the defendant would always veto allocating the entitlement to itself. 
97. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970). Whalen v. Union 
Bag & Paper Co. , 101 N.E. 805 (N.Y. 1913), also provides an extreme example of the will­
ingness of some courts to issue injunctions where a defendant's loss far exceeds the plaintiff's 
benefit. In the Union Bag case (discussed later in Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 872) the court as­
sessed the plaintiff's harm at $100 per year, while compliance with the injunction caused the 
permanent closing of a mill at an investment loss of more than $1,000,000. 101 N.E. at 805. 
The New York Court of Appeals concluded, "[A]lthough the damage to the plaintiff may be 
slight as compared with the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not a good 
reason for refusing an injunction." Id. at 806; see also Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threat­
ening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1999). 
98. The single-chooser rules can also be distributively embarrassing when there is a 
great disparity in the litigants' mean valuations. Such rules can force the policy makers at 
times to confront unpalatable divisions. For example, if a court decided that the residents in 
Boomer were the more efficient choosers, it would have to choose between a call rule, which 
might force residents to pay a large sum to stop the pollution, and a put rule, which might 
force the polluter to disgorge all of its expected profits from polluting. Our foregoing con­
vexity result, however, resolves the distributive embarrassment under either the single- or 
dual-chooser implementations. 
99. Of course, if their mean valuations diverge too much (or more specifically, if their 
probability distributions do not overlap), then the court cannot achieve, nor would they de­
sire, a more nuanced allocation, even under the dual-chooser rules. I n  such an extreme case, 
the court would know for certain that one litigant's valuation exceeded the other litigant's 
valuation and would thus face no informational disadvantage. The court could therefore 
simply award the entitlement to the higher valuing litigant. 
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mean valuations, greater allocative efficiency would be produced by a 
single-chooser allocation - granting the allocative choice to the 
chooser with the larger variance. The intuition here is that one head 
can be better than two when one of the heads is relatively ignorant. 
When the litigants' valuation variances differ greatly, courts should 
exclude the low variance litigant from having any influence on the ul­
timate allocation. A litigant with a relatively small variance has very 
little informational advantage over either the court or the opposing 
litigant. When the different-variance effect thus dominates the differ­
ent-mean effect, courts should select a single chooser rather than allow 
a second litigant with very little private information to muck up the 
allocation. 
In a recent article on the "anticommons," Michael Heller has per­
suasively argued that there is an efficient number of vetoers to the de­
ployment of entitlements. 100 The traditional commons problem occurs 
is when the number of potential vetoers is too small - no one can 
veto the deployment of the entitlement. But an analogous anticom­
mons problem exists when there are too many vetoers who can block 
the deployment of an entitlement. Heller's canonical examples con­
cern modern Russia, where entrepreneurs may need the approval of 
dozens of organizations before they can use a piece of property to 
open a business. 101 Our finding that single-chooser allocations can 
dominate dual-chooser allocations suggests that the anticommons inef­
ficiency can kick in even when the number of vetoers is just two. 
Sometimes it is efficient to have only a single vetoer. 
For a more concrete example, consider again a defendant whose 
value is uniformly distributed between $0 and $100 and a plaintiff 
whose value is uniformly distributed between $25 and $75. Notice now 
that this example in intentionally constructed so that the different­
variance effect will dominate the different-mean effect, for the liti­
gants have the same mean valuations {µn = µ1.1 = $50), but their valua­
tion variances differ (a21.1 = $833.33 > in = $208.33). As our prior 
analysis showed, the equality of means will tend to make the two dual­
chooser rules allocatively equivalent. The inequality in variances also 
suggests that the defendant-choice allocation will dominate the 
plaintiff-choice allocation.102 But what still needs to be shown is why 
the defendant-choice (single-chooser) allocation dominates either of 
the equivalent dual-chooser allocations. 
100. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 1 1 1  HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998). 
101. See id. at 633-42. 
102. The example can also be easily converted to show how a plaintiff-joint-veto rule 
can dominate any of the other three foundational allocations by simply reversing the identity 
of the plaintiff and defendant probability distributions - so that the plaintiffs value was 
distributed uniformly between $0 and $100, and the defendant's value between $80 and $180. 
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When litigant variances differ greatly, dual-chooser allocations be­
come problematic because they allow the more informationally disad­
vantaged chooser - the chooser with the less variant valuation - to 
have too much control over the entitlement's ultimate allocation. For 
example, as shown in Figure 6's depiction of the plaintiff-presumption 
allocation, even when the plaintiff's value is higher than the nominal 
damage price, this does not provide very good assurance that the 
plaintiff's value is higher than the defendant's (higher variance) valua­
tion. 
Indeed, as discussed above, the relative inferiority of the plaintiff 
as chooser in this example causes the optimal damages for the plain­
tiff-presumption rule to exceed the mean valuations of both parties, 
such that Dnp = $62.50 > µn = µLJ = $50. Because the plaintiff­
presumption rule gives the plaintiff too much power to self-allocate 
the entitlement, the optimal damages under this rule are raised to re­
duce the plaintiff's incentives to self-allocate. Because the litigants 
also differ in their level of private information, it is better to induce 
the defendant to inefficiently under-take (that is, to allocate the enti­
tlement too often to the plaintiff) in order to restrict the poorly in­
formed plaintiff's incentive to over-take (that is, to self-allocate the 
entitlement too often). The fact that optimal dual-chooser damages lie 
outside the litigants' mean valuations is evidence that one of the liti­
gants is a particularly inefficient chooser and therefore provides evi­
dence that dual-chooser allocations will tend to be inefficient relative 
to single-chooser allocations. 
The graphical difference between these allocations concerns which 
litigant will ultimately possess the entitlement in quadrant II. The 
defendant-choice single-chooser rule allocates this quadrant to the de­
fendant, thereby enhancing allocative efficiency. Witness Figure 6, 
which shows that more of the probability space in quadrant II con­
tains situations in which the defendant's valuation exceeds the plain­
tiff's (as seen from the larger mass of this quadrant above the 
forty-five-degree first-best efficiency line). The simpler defendant­
choice rule divests the plaintiff of allocative power and thus lowers the 
optimal damages back down to $50 and increases the expected joint 
payoff from $60.54 under the plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser allo­
cation to $62.50 under the defendant-choice allocation. 103 
103. An analogous argument also shows why, in this example, a defendant-choice allo­
cation dominates the defendant-presumption dual-chooser regime. Under a defendant­
presumption rule, the defendant cannot prevent the plaintiff from under-taking and putting 
the entitlement to the defendant even when the high expected mean defendant has a seri­
ously low actual valuation. This scenario exists in much of the lower-left quadrant. A 
defendant-presumption rule lowers the optimal damages below the litigants' mean valua­
tions in order to increase the poorly informed plaintiff's incentive to allocate the entitlement 
to the defendant unilaterally. Rather than distort damages this way, however, we can even 
more efficiently give all the allocative power to the defendant through a single-chooser rule. 
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The foregoing two examples were intentionally constructed to 
highlight the impact of the different-mean and different-variance 
effects by alternately setting one or the other of these differences to 
zero. But, more generally, the litigants' distributions may display a 
mixture of both mean and variance differences. In such cases, selec­
tion of the most efficient allocation will tum on which of these differ­
ence effects dominates. Figure 7 graphically shows for a uniform ex­
ample which of the four basic allocations will dominate - holding 
variance constant - as we change the relative mean valuations of the 
two litigants. For example, in panel (a), imagine that the plaintiff's 
valuation is uniformly distributed over a $100 range, while the defen­
dant's valuation is uniformly distributed over only a $50 range. Of 
course, this assumption implies that the variance of the plaintiff's 
value exceeds the variance of the defendant's value. We can then add 
the litigant's relative mean valuations to the figure by drawing in a 
particular forty-five-degree locus of points in which the litigants' 
valuations are equal. Thus, the forty-five-degree line toward the upper 
left-hand corner depicts an example in which the plaintiff's mean is 
greater than the defendant's, while the forty-five-degree line toward 
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the lower-right hand comer depicts an example in which the defen­
dant's mean is greater than the plaintiff's. 
Figure 7 
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Panel (a) shows that - holding the variance difference constant -
as the mean difference varies (from a higher plaintiff mean to a higher 
defendant mean), three different fundamental allocations in turn be­
come the most efficient. For sufficiently large differences in litigant 
means in the plaintiff's favor, the different-mean effect dominates the 
different-variance effect, making the plaintiff-presumption dual­
chooser allocation the most efficient. 104 For intermediate differences in 
the litigants' means, the different-variance effect dominates, and so 
the plaintiff-choice single-chooser allocation dominates. Finally, for 
sufficiently large mean differences in the defendant's favor, the differ­
ent-mean effect again dominates the variance effect, this time render­
ing the defendant-presumption dual-chooser allocation the most effi­
cient. Panel (b) works out the optimal allocations for an example in 
which the variance of the defendant's valuation exceeds that of the 
plaintiff's. When the different-mean effect dominates, one of the dual­
chooser allocations is most efficient; when the difference in the liti­
gants' means is not as large, the variance effect dominates, and a 
104. If µn - µ. > $25, then given the $50 assumed difference in the litigants' uniform dis­
tribution limits, the plaintiff-presumption allocation produces the highest payoffs. If 
$25 > µn - µ. > - $25, then the plaintiff-choice single-chooser allocation produces the highest 
payoffs. Finally, if µn - µ. < - $25, then the defendant-presumption allocation produces the 
highest payoffs. 
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defendant-choice single-chooser allocation is most efficient. Indeed, 
for the uncorrelated, uniform distribution, the best single-chooser al­
location will at least weakly dominate the best dual-chooser allocation 
whenever: 
I An - A." d :::: I µu -µ,ij 
(where the plaintiff and defendant valuations are uniformly distrib­
uted between µ ± A.). 105 
In sum, we have now provided a complete analysis of the four ba­
sic single-price allocations. We have also shown what damages opti­
mize allocative efficiency for each type of allocation. We have shown 
when each type of the four allocations will tend to be allocatively op­
timal. And we have shown how courts are free to independently dis­
tribute the expected payoff between the litigants. 
III. SECOND (AND HIGHER) ORDER RULES 
In a previous article, Ian Ayres and Jack Balkin analyzed a type of 
regime under what they called a "second-order" liability rule.106 A 
second-order rule constitutes a type of dual-chooser allocation be­
cause each litigant makes successive allocative choices. Unlike the 
dual-chooser allocations analyzed above, however, the second-order 
rules do not rely on a single judicially determined allocative price. In­
stead, second-order rules force one litigant to confront one allocative 
exercise price, and force the other litigant to confront a different allo­
cative exercise price. 
For example, if both the plaintiff and defendant have valuations 
uniformly distributed between $0 and $100, one type of optimal 
second-order liability rule would induce the defendant to exercise an 
option to take when its value is higher than $33.33, but would induce 
the plaintiff to take back the entitlement when its entitlement is 
greater than $66.66. Ayres and Balkin showed that second-order rules 
mimicked the allocations of an auction with minimum bid incre­
ments.107 This allocative equilibrium is graphically displayed in Figure 
105. See Avraham, supra note 22; Appendix, supra note 40. 
106. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9. 
107. See id. at 727-28. Unlike traditional auctions, however, in which the proceeds of the 
auction go to a non-bidder, the internal auction produced by second (and higher-) order 
rules is one in which the proceeds from the winning bidder are paid to the losing bidder. One 
could imagine more explicit (external) auction implementations - in which the state initially 
took an entitlement (for some fixed payment to plaintiff) and then auctioned the entitlement 
to the highest bidder (with the state retaining auction proceeds). Such an auction would fully 
economize on the litigants' private information and could be implemented with much more 
transparent bidding strategies. This more explicit auction might prove the most efficient of 
all depending on the relative transaction costs. And by varying the initial payments from the 
government to each of the litigants, the explicit auction approach is also compatible with the 
type of distribution decoupling discussed above. 
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8. The plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser allocation is a type of 
second-order liability rule, but one in which the first- and second­
order exercise prices are constrained to be the same. 
$0 
Figure 8 
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Ayres and Balkin also showed that allowing exercise prices to vary 
induces strategic taking behavior by the initial decisionmaker. For 
example, in the foregoing hypothetical a defendant with a private 
valuation of only $33 would still find it advantageous to exercise an 
initial call option to take an entitlement for $33.33 (thus, paying more 
than its valuation) because doing so might induce the plaintiff to take 
back and pay the defendant $66.66. In order to induce optimal taking 
strategies, the nominal damage amounts would need to be set at 
$44.44 (for the defendant's call option) and $66.66 (for the plaintiff's 
take-back call option). Given the odds that the plaintiff's valuation 
will exceed $66.66 and that the plaintiff will therefore take the enti­
tlement back, the defendant's expected profit from strategically taking 
the entitlement for a price of $44.44 is negative when the defendant's 
true valuation falls anywhere below $33.33. Because of this incentive 
for strategic taking, the exercise prices of second-order rules do not 
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induce transparently obvious player strategies. 
Like its constrained dual-chooser siblings, second-order rules have 
multiple option variations that will induce allocatively equivalent allo­
cations. For example, either of the following allocations produces what 
we call an "unconstrained-plaintiff-presumption" allocation: 
II: E - call(Low)  + ca ll(High) �: + ca ll(Low) - ca ll(H igh )  (1)  
II: E + put(H igh ) - put(Low) �:  - put(H igh )  + put(Low), (2 ) 
where the parenthetical Low's and High's merely indicate the ordinal 
size of the two exercise prices. 
In the first implementation (1), the plaintiff (a) receives the initial 
entitlement, (b) subject to the defendant's call option, but ( c) also has 
a call option to take back the entitlement at a higher price. Like the 
earlier plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser allocation, this allocation 
allows either litigant to veto the transfer of the entitlement to the de­
fendant. Defendants can veto the transfer of the entitlement to them­
selves by refusing to exercise their initial call option, and even if the 
defendants exercise their call options, the plaintiffs can veto the trans­
fer by exercising their take-back call option. Alternatively, under the 
second implementation (2) ,  the plaintiff receives (a) the initial enti­
tlement and (b) an option to put to the defendant at a high exercise 
price, but ( c) the defendant receives an option to put the entitlement 
back to the plaintiff at a lower exercise price.108 An analogous second­
order allocation can be implemented by what we call "unconstrained 
defendant-presumption" allocations simply by reversing the foregoing 
plaintiff and defendant roles. 
While these second-order rules may seem the most bizarre of our 
ever expanding universe of "liability" rules, Ayres and Balkin have 
shown that the court implicitly implemented a second-order rule in the 
venerable common law chestnut, Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation 
Co. 109 In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held a ship owner 
liable when his ship damaged a dock while he attempted to moor the 
ship during a storm. The court simultaneously acknowledged that it 
would have ordered the dock owner to pay damages to the ship owner 
if the dock owner had subsequently unmoored the defendant's ship, 
causing it to suffer damage in the storm. As Ayres and Balkin noted: 
108. The same allocation might also be induced by: 
CT: - put(Low) + call(High) �: E + put(Low) - call(High) (3) 
Under this third implementation (3), the defendant has the initial entitlement and a put 
option with a low exercise price, while the plaintiff receives a call option with a high exercise 
price. The plaintiff and defendant might have to exercise their respective options simultane­
ously. The entitlement would end up with the defendant only if neither litigant vetoed such 
an allocation by exercising an option. Although the litigants might simultaneously exercise 
these options, we would still expect nontransparent strategies, as each party would hedge on 
its decision to exercise and hope that the other litigant would exercise at a more favorable 
price. 
109. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
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Vincent [is] a vivid example of how the common law protects an option 
to take an entitlement (a liability rule) with another liability rule. The 
dock owner holds the initial entitlement to the physical security of the 
dock. The shipowner (because of the exigencies of the storm) has a first­
stage option to "take" the dock by mooring the ship to it and by paying 
damages for any injury that results. The dock owner has a second-stage 
option to unmoor the ship, but at a cost: The dock owner gives up a 
cause of action against the shipowner for damages and exposes himself to 
tort liability for any damages to the ship and its crew.110 
Under Vincent, both the ship and dock owners had a say in the ulti­
mate allocation of the dock, and while nothing indicated that the court 
intended to set allocatively optimal rules, it certainly did not constrain 
the potential damages in the first and second stages to the same 
amount (in contrast with the aforementioned single-price, dual­
chooser allocations) .  
This Section extends Ayres and Balkin's previous analysis by 
showing more generally how courts should tailor second-order 
damages, as well as by showing that we can apply our convexity result 
to second-order rules and again decouple a court's distributive and al­
locative concerns. Finally, we compare these unconstrained dual­
chooser allocations to the four single-price allocations. Intuitively, it 
should not be surprising that a less constrained rule should operate 
more efficiently than more constrained rules, and indeed, we find that, 
absent transaction costs, second-order rules dominate. 
A. Selecting Optimal Damages 
Calculating optimal damages is computationally difficult - even 
more so than solving the dual-chooser optimization equation outlined 
above. We readily admit that such calculations will outstrip the com­
putational capacity and temperament of judges. Still, it is possible to 
make some progress on the underlying process that would guide a 
judge inclined to make such an allocation (possibly with the aid of a 
fairly simple piece of computer software) . 1 1 1  First, it is useful to break 
the task into two parts: (1) identifying the optimal "pivot values" that 
110. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 716. Jon Hanson and Matt Stowe first noticed this 
unusual aspect of Vincent. See Jon Hanson & Matt Stowe, Lecture Notes, Torts, Harvard 
Law School (Fall 1996) (on file with the Yale Law Journal). Robert Ellickson long ago also 
proposed a modification of nuisance rules that would amount to a common law implementa­
tion of a second-order rule. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nui­
sance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973). 
111 .  The real difficulty facing a judge involves reduction of a litigant's valuation to a 
probability density function. Once a judge accomplishes this (and interactive software al­
ready exists to help quantiphobes undertake just this task through a series of yes/no ques­
tions), a piece of software can complete the fairly trivial next step of numerically calculating 
the optimal damages. We guess that more complicated computational problems are sur­
mounted every time someone dials a phone number. 
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define when a chooser will optimally allocate the entitlement to itself 
or allocate it to the other litigant; and (2) identifying the nominal 
damages that will induce the litigants to adopt particular pivot values 
as their equilibrium strategies. For example, in the hypothetical situa­
tion above, we set nominal damages at $44.44 and $66.66 so as to in­
duce pivot values of $33.33 and $66.66. 
The first task of identifying the optimal pivot value has a surpris­
ingly simple intuition, which we call the "dispositive-takings princi­
ple." To see how this principle might work, consider again a second­
order regime in which the defendant has a first-stage call option to 
take and the plaintiff has a second-stage option to take back at a 
higher price. While it makes superficial sense for a court to want to in­
duce takings when the taker believes that its value is greater than the 
expected value of the takee, this approach ignores the fact that, in a 
second-order regime, many of the first-stage takings will not be dispo­
sitive - that is, they will not allocate the entitlement. Some of the 
first-stage takees will have values higher than the expected values of 
the taker, and they will protect their interests by taking back. The op­
timal pivot values should focus on the allocations of particular choos­
ers that are expected to be final, or dispositive. Hence, optimal exer­
cise prices for second-order rules should induce the first-stage taker to 
take whenever the taker's private valuation exceeds the expected 
valuation of takees who will not take back. ' ' 2  The dispositive-takings 
principle requires that dispositive takings must on average increase 
welfare. 
While the dispositive takings principle has intuitive appeal, imple­
menting it would require a judge to simultaneously solve a system of 
two equations for the two unknown pivot values: 
Pivot� = E { vn I v n < Pivot n} 
Pivotn = E { v Ll I v Ll > Pivot Ll } 
where Pivot Ll and Pivot n represent the pivot values at which defen­
dants and plaintiffs choose to exercise their taking and take-back op­
tions, respectively. 1 13 The first pivot equation asks what is the plain-
112. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 717, proved that the dispositive-taking principal 
maximized allocative efficiency when the litigants' valuations were uniformly distributed and 
conjectured that the principal would also hold true for more general distributions. In the 
Appendix, supra note 40, we prove this to be true. 
113. The equations can be restated in terms of the explicit integrals and probability den­
sity functions as well: 
00 
Pivott. = Jvn fn (vn )dvn 
PivolJl 
Pivot/.\ 
Pivot = J v f ( v )dv 
n o 6 6 6 6 
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tiff's expected value given that the plaintiff will not take back. It is this 
class of plaintiffs for whom the defendant's taking will be dispositive. 
The second pivot equation asks what is the defendant's expected value 
given that it initially exercised its option to take. It is this class of de­
fendant for whom the plaintiff's taking back will be dispositive. 
But even after undertaking the arduous task of calculating the op­
timal pivot values, a court would then - because of the first-stage 
strategic exercise incentive - still need to solve a second system of 
equations to determine what nominal damage amounts will induce the 
desired pivot strategies. Because second-stage takings are nonstrate­
gic, the second-stage damages are identical to the second-stage pivot 
value: 
Drr = Pivotrr .  
But the first-stage damages (because of the problem of strategic first­
stage taking) are more complicated: 
D LI = P(v rr < Pivot rr)Pivot LI + P(v rr > Pivot rr)Pivot TT· 
Notice that first-stage damages equal a weighted average of the two 
optimal pivot values (where the weights concern the probability that 
the plaintiff's value falls above or below the plaintiff's take-back pivot 
value). For example, if the plaintiff and defendant have identical 
probability density functions that take on a quadratic form with zero 
probability mass at $0 and $100,1 14 then it can be shown in applying the 
foregoing dispositive takings equations that the players' joint payoffs 
are maximized if the defendant takes when its valuation is greater than 
$37.80 and the plaintiff takes back when its valuation is greater than 
$62.20. And to induce these pivot values, it is necessary for a court to 
set first-stage damages for defendant taking equal to $45.62 and 
second-stage damages for plaintiff taking back equal to $62.20.1 15 Thus, 
while optimal damages for second-order liability rules are tractable for 
any possible combination of valuation distributions, the present-day 
judiciary will even less likely implement these rules accurately than 
the variants mentioned above. 
B. Selecting the Distribution 
Continuing bravely on, we find that if a court could determine the 
allocatively optimal damages, it could again vary the litigants' individ­
ual expected payoffs without affecting the litigants' allocative choice. 
In other words, we can extend our previous convexity result to include 
second-order liability rules. 
114. Formally, the density functions would take the form:.f{v) = 6v(J-v). 
115. An example with the much simpler uniform distribution is derived in Ayres & 
Balkin, supra note 9. 
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Consider, for instance, the familiar example of two litigants with 
uniformly distributed valuations between $0 and $100. As discussed 
earlier, one example of a second-order rule with optimal damages 
would give the defendant a first-stage taking call option with a $44.44 
exercise price and the plaintiff a second-stage take-back call option 
with a $66.66 exercise price. These nominal damages would induce the 
optimal pivot strategies in that the defendant would take when its 
value is greater than $33.33 and the plaintiff will take back when its 
value is greater than $66.66. 1 16 
But the same pivot strategies can be induced by a regime that gives 
the defendant the first-stage choice of paying $24.44 to the plaintiff to 
take the entitlement (De= $24.44) or receiving $20 from the plaintiff if 
it does not take (DNc = -$20), and giving the plaintiff the same second­
stage choice of paying $66.66 to take back the entitlement (De = 
$66.66; DNe = $0). Under such a rule, the defendant will still perceive a 
$44.44 cost to taking in the first stage, and thus will continue to find it 
worthwhile to strategically take whenever its value is greater than 
$33.33. But again, by changing the first-stage option into a pay-or-be­
paid rule, this implementation effectively shifts some of the expected 
total payoff from the plaintiff to the defendant. All that matters allo­
catively is the equality between the difference between De and DNe 
and the nominal damages that would be optimal under a more tradi­
tional call or put rule. As emphasized above, calculating this initial 
number becomes computationally awkward, but a court can easily 
move De and DNe in lockstep to create pay-or-be-paid or pay-or-pay 
rules that produce distributively different, but allocatively identical, 
equilibria. Even in the implementation of second-order rules, a court 
can make its distributive decision independently of its allocative deci­
sion. So just as there is an infinite class of rules that implement the two 
single-chooser allocations and an infinite number of rules that imple­
ment the two dual-chooser allocations, there turns out to be an infinite 
class of rules that can implement the two second-order allocations. 
C. Selecting the Chooser 
Which of these two second-order equilibria will be allocatively su­
perior - the "unconstrained defendant-presumption" allocation or 
the "unconstrained plaintiff-presumption" allocation? The answer 
116. Notice how this equilibrium comports with the dispositive takings principle. The 
defendant takes only when the defendant values the entitlement more than those plaintiffs 
who will not take it back. The class of plaintiffs who will not take back has valuations rang­
ing from $0 to $66.66, and the defendant will take when valuing the entitlement more than 
the mid-point of this range, $33.33. Similarly, the plaintiff will take back only when the plain­
tiff values the entitlement more than those defendants who took it in the first stage. The 
class of defendants from whom a plaintiff might take back has valuations ranging from 
$33.33 to $100, and the plaintiff will take back only when valuing the entitlement more than 
the midpoint of this range, $66.66. 
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parallels our earlier analysis of the constrained dual-chooser alloca­
tions: it depends on the litigants' relative mean valuations. The over­
arching principle continues to be that as between the two second­
order rules, courts should tend to allow either party to veto allocations 
to the party with the lower mean valuation. This means that the un­
constrained plaintiff-presumption equilibrium will tend to operate 
more efficiently than the unconstrained defendant-presumption equi­
librium when 
µn > µ tJ ·  
For example, imagine that the defendant's valuation is uniformly 
distributed between $0 and $100 and that the plaintiff's valuation is 
uniformly distributed between $80 and $180. We can show that the op­
timal pivot values for an unconstrained plaintiff-presumption alloca­
tion equal $86.66 and $93.33 for the defendant and plaintiff, respec­
tively.1 17 In contrast, the optimal pivot values for an unconstrained 
defendant-presumption allocation equal $60 for the plaintiff and $120 
for the defendant, respectively.1 18 Each of these pivot values lies out­
side the range of the litigant's valuation distributions, and, as a result, 
an unconstrained defendant-presumption allocation with optimal 
damages would always allocate the entitlement to the plaintiff. Figure 
9 graphically depicts the two allocations induced by the two rules, with 
optimal pivot values. 1 19 As shown in the figure, the unconstrained 
plaintiff-presumption rule is more efficient than an unconstrained 
defendant-presumption rule (as the relative difference in misallocated 
entitlements demonstrates) .  The unconstrained plaintiff-presumption 
rule on balance does a better job of allocating the entitlement to the 
defendant in the unusual circumstance when the defendant has the 
higher value, whereas the unconstrained defendant-presumption rule 
can do no better than allocating the entitlement solely to the plaintiff. 
117. By the dispositive takings principle, the pivot values must simultaneously satisfy the 
following two equations: 
. 80 + Pivot n Pivot , + 100 
Pivot , = ---� and Pivot n = ' 
2 2 
which, when solved, yield the values in the text. The nominal damages that would induce 
these pivot taking values equal $92.43 for the defendant's takings and $93.33 for the plaintiff 
taking back. 
118. According to the dispositive-takings principle, the pivot value must simultaneously 
satisfy the following two equations: 
1 80 + Pivot n 
Pivot A = 2 
, and Pivot 6 Pivot n = -- ' 
2 
which, when solved yield the same values in the text. 
1 19. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 727 fig.l. 
October 2001] 
100 
Pivot J = 86.66 
80 
V J  
0 
Optimal Delegation and Decoupling 
Figure 9 
80 93.33 = Pivot 11 180 
Entitlement incorrectly allocated under U !IP 
Entitlement incorrectly allocated under U LI P  
Entitlement incorrectly allocated under either 
rule 
D. Selecting Among the Six Foundational Allocations 
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Finally, we can usefully compare the relative efficiency of all six 
fundamental allocations. If courts could accurately calculate optimal 
damages for second-order allocations, the better second-order alloca­
tion would always weakly dominate all other allocations in the sense 
of producing at least as high an expected total payoff for the litigants 
as any of the other five allocations. This is intuitively obvious because 
the second-order rules have fewer constraints than either single­
chooser or dual-chooser rules. The court sets not one, but two alloca­
tive prices and thus has more freedom to harness the private informa­
tion of both litigants. Setting two (or more) allocative prices allows a 
court to establish an internal auction - where each taking at a se­
quentially higher price (or, as is the case with put options, lower price) 
effectively allows the individual litigants to credibly signal more in-
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formation about their private valuations. 120 Heuristically, these less 
constrained liability rules permit the court to make more nuanced as­
signments of allocative authority. Just as the convexity result permits 
courts to distribute the expected payoffs as they see fit, the higher­
order liability rules permit courts to distribute allocative power as they 
see fit - instead of giving one side or the other the sole allocative au­
thority (as with single-chooser rules), or giving the two parties sym­
metric allocative authority (as with the constrained dual-chooser 
rules). 
More prosaically, second-order rules can never operate less effi­
ciently than the other rules because, with the appropriate choice of 
damages, second-order rules themselves can effect the same alloca­
tions as either of the single-chooser or dual-chooser allocations. 
Courts can shape second-order rules to effectuate single-chooser allo­
cations by setting the first-stage exercise price at the nonchooser's 
valuation and then setting the second-stage price at a sufficiently pro­
hibitive amount so that the second-stage chooser would not exercise it. 
In addition, courts can shape second-order rules to effectuate dual­
chooser allocations by simply setting the first- and second-stage exer­
cise prices equal to one another.1 21 
Nevertheless, much as we are attracted to the elegant way in which 
second-order rules harness the information of both litigants, even 
when one litigant has relatively poor information, we believe there are 
many pragmatic drawbacks to implementing second-order rules that 
rightly refocus our attention on the single-price dual-chooser alloca­
tions. This latter type of dual-chooser allocation often represents the 
best pragmatic alternative available to courts for harnessing both liti­
gants' private information in allocating an entitlement.122 The con­
strained dual-chooser allocations, by definition, require the courts to 
calculate only a single allocative price, which, in the normal case, will 
approach something close to the average of the litigants' mean valua­
tions. The single-price dual-chooser allocations analyzed above also 
induce transparent, dominant strategies that both the court and the 
litigants can readily understand. If the court sets dual-chooser dam­
ages at $Dnp under a plaintiff-presumption allocation, the entitlement 
will go to the defendant only if vn < DnP < VLJ. The relative simplicity 
and transparency of such allocations suggest that the theoretical 
1 20. See id. at 729. 
121. Indeed, Ayres and Balkin have shown that in a world with costless takings, succes­
sively higher-order rules can achieve successively higher expected total payoffs. See id. at 
727-33. Higher-order liability rules create more refined auctions with smaller minimum bid 
increments, and as a theoretical matter, these rules in the limit can produce first-best effi­
ciency. 
122. Ayres and Balkin, id. at 733-36, have shown, for example, that as the transaction 
costs of taking or of calculating damages increase, single-price rules will tend to dominate 
multiple-allocative-price rules. 
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dominance of second-order regimes does not moot our initial efforts 
to identify how courts should select from an admittedly constrained 
class of single-price allocations. 
IV. EXTENDING THE ANALYSIS 
In this Section, we relax many of the more stringent assumptions of 
the foregoing analysis and assess the extent to which these assump­
tions limit the model's applicability or its normative implications. 
A Administrative Costs 
The foregoing analysis ignored the costs of administering the 
liability rules. These costs will likely drive efficiency-minded law­
makers toward simpler rules. As just mentioned, second-order rules 
may, for example, entail high transactional or computational costs. 123 
Indeed, when bargaining becomes impossible, the costs of liability rule 
administration may militate toward the use of property rules.124 Prop­
erty rules tend to deter nonconsensual takings and thus avoid the costs 
of administering a liability rule regime. When transaction costs remain 
relatively low, on the other hand, the litigation costs involved in ad­
ministering a liability rule can somewhat counterintuitively facilitate 
greater allocative efficiency.125 Under a liability regime, litigation costs 
give the parties an additional impetus to negotiate and hence can 
make liability rules more efficient than property rules. 
Carol Rose has also stressed that courts may need to incur nontriv­
ial costs in determining which parties should have a potential claim to 
ultimate ownership of particular entitlements.126 The costs of deter­
mining who owns what entitlements will again militate in favor of 
property rules but should not greatly impact which of the liability rules 
will work best. The foregoing analysis suggests that optimal tailoring 
of a liability regime will tum on an assessment of the litigants' valua­
tion distributions. We will return to these issues again when we con­
sider the associated problems of "numerosity." 
123. Id. at 717. 
124. One still faces, however, the administration cost of determining who should be as­
signed the property right. Under certain circumstances, the costs of determining the high 
valuing litigant may exceed the costs of calculating damages. Richard R. W. Brooks, Choos­
ing Property Rules or Liability Rules: The Burden of Determining Optimal Remedies (Aug. 
2001) (unpublished working paper) (on file with authors). 
125. Ayres and Talley, supra note 9, at 1065-72, stressed this point. 
126. See Rose, supra note 9, at 2190-91. 
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B. Alternative Informational Assumptions 
The foregoing analysis made imperfect information assumptions 
that are standard in the law and economics literature - namely, we 
assumed that the probability distributions of the litigants are (after 
trial) common knowledge, but only litigants know their own true 
valuations.127 Here, we consider three variations on these assumptions: 
(a) the litigants are imperfectly informed about their own true valua­
tions; (b) the litigants' probability functions are not common knowl­
edge; and (c) courts systematically misestimate the probability distri­
butions of the litigants' values. 
The possibility that litigants do not precisely know their own valua­
tions does not seriously limit our analysis. Although litigants may not 
know with precision the prospective value of owning an entitlement, 
the litigants nonetheless might estimate a certain cash-equivalent 
amount that would leave them indifferent as between the entitlement 
or this cash amount. Just as individuals often buy and sell entitlements 
for discrete cash amounts despite their uncertainty about the future 
value of ownership, litigants may be able to estimate their own values. 
As long as the individual litigants are better informed than the 
court, liability rules - by privatizing the ultimate allocative authority 
- can enhance ex post efficiency. In mathematical terms, as long as 
litigants' beliefs about their valuation probability functions have less 
volatility than the court's beliefs about the litigants' valuations, the 
litigants will have an informational advantage over the court in ulti­
mately allocating the entitlement. 128 
Even if litigants know their own valuations, one might worry that 
they cannot, contrary to our model's assumption, assess even the 
probability distribution of the other party. Nonetheless, we believe 
that this should also not pose a large concern. Liability rules do not 
require a chooser to assess directly the probability functions of an ad­
versary; rather, a chooser need only confront the court-determined 
damage amount, or what we have called the allocative price. Court­
appointed choosers do not need to estimate nonchooser valuations as 
long as the court itself, after discovery and trial, can estimate a valua­
tion distribution sufficiently to determine optimal single- or dual­
chooser damages.129 As stressed above, single-chooser allocations will 
127. See, e.g. , Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, Bargaining Under Incomplete 
Information, 31 OPERATIONS RES. 835 (1983); Peter C. Cramton, Strategic Delay in Bargain­
ing with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 205 (1992). 
128. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
129. In some contexts, especially with regard to dual-chooser regimes, a potential liti­
gant makes the first-stage choice before the court has determined damages. For example, a 
potential defendant may decide to encroach in anticipation of the plaintiff having the put­
like choice of injunction or damages for permanent encroachment. In such circumstances, a 
rational encroacher would want to assess what damages the court will likely set. 
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also tend to simplify the court's decisionmaking by requiring the court 
to estimate only the mean of the litigant with the less speculative 
valuation. Of course, the less speculative valuation may still, from the 
court's perspective, remain quite speculative, but courts only need to 
make an unbiased estimate in order to harness the litigant's private in­
formation in allocating the entitlement. 
A more serious informational concern involves court estimates of 
litigants' valuation distributions that for some reason become system­
atically biased. For example, if courts in implementing single-chooser 
allocations systematically underestimated (overestimated) the non­
chooser means, then they would set damages too low (high) and would 
induce the chooser to inefficiently allocate the entitlement too often 
(rarely) to itself. If higher branches of government (appellate courts or 
the legislature) realize that lower branches (trial courts/juries) system­
atically underestimate the mean value of residents, a standard re­
sponse is that the higher branch might force the lower branch to es­
chew liability rules altogether and instead give the residents the 
pollution entitlement protected by a property rule. If the mean valua­
tion assessments of the more authoritative branches of government 
are also biased, the allocation problem becomes truly intractable. We 
readily admit that our model will not perform well, but neither will 
most other allocative regimes. 
C. Unintentional Taking 
Our option model has been quintessentially about intentional tak­
ings. One or both litigants choose whether to exercise intentionally a 
particular option. In many contexts, this assumption is reasonable. Po­
tential defendants at times make deliberate decisions to impair plain­
tiffs' entitlements. The plaintiffs' election of remedies to seek an in­
junction or monetary damages also almost always fits the deliberate 
model. 
Many, if not most, torts, however, concern unintentional takings. 
We therefore must ask whether our models have anything to say to 
this large class of takings. We believe they do. First, unintentional tak­
ings actually increase the ability of courts to apply single-chooser allo­
cations, especially plaintiff-choice allocations. If Calabresi inadver­
tently and nonstrategically encroaches on Melamed's land, courts have 
even greater freedom to apply a true plaintiff-choice allocation and 
give Melamed unilateral allocative authority based on a single alloca­
tive price. With regard to deliberate encroachments, by contrast, 
courts may not be able to apply a pure plaintiff-choice allocation, be­
cause potential encroachers may take into account the second-stage 
plaintiff choice when deciding whether or not in the first stage to en­
croach. 
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Second, and more speculatively, an options model of deliberate 
taking may have something to tell us about negligence regimes. Even 
when potential defendants do not deliberately take plaintiffs' entitle­
ments, the defendants often do make deliberate choices as to the care 
level they will use to avoid taking. In some contexts we can think 
about choice of care level as tantamount to choosing the probability 
that an accident will occur. Put more in the argot of finance, level of 
care choices represent the potential defendants' choice of probability 
that they will exercise their takings options. Damages that equal the 
nonchooser's mean valuation - that is, the plaintiff's mean valuation 
of impairment - will induce takings only when the probabilistic value 
of takings, as measured in saved due care costs, exceeds the plaintiff's 
average loss. Thus, we can restate the Learned Hand formula in op­
tion terms, but we often do not gain much from the translation. Many 
torts do not fit a plaintiff-choice allocation because once the defen­
dants destroy the entitlements, a court cannot ask the plaintiffs 
whether they would prefer the entitlements themselves (for example, 
an arm) instead of cash. 
Even with regard to negligent taking, however, some circum­
stances may permit a second-stage plaintiff election of remedy, and 
the foregoing analysis may apply. If Epstein negligently takes 
Calabresi's galoshes at the theater, common law courts can give, and 
traditionally have given, Calabresi the option to take back the shoes or 
to receive money.130 In setting the damage amount, the court may cre­
ate a kind of dual-chooser allocation that would impact both the due 
care with which Epstein examines galoshes at the theater and 
Calabresi's decision whether to seek injunctive or damage relief. 
D. Numerosity 
Our previous discussion has relentlessly focused on bilateral dis­
putes. We have assumed that a dispute concerns only one plaintiff and 
one defendant; and we have also assumed that there are no third par­
ties who might contend for being the highest valuer of the entitlement. 
Both of these assumptions characterize a nontrivial amount of real­
world litigation. For example, in Copart Industries v. Consolidated 
Edison, a particular type of pollution from a ConEd plant disrupted 
the ability of a single plaintiff to continue its new car preparation 
business. 131 Many nuisance disputes, however, will involve multiple 
litigants on one or both sides of the litigation. For example, the ten­
dency of pollution to spread means that a single defendant's effluence 
130. See Ayres, supra note 9, at 794. 
131. 362 N.E.2d 968 (N.Y. 1977); see also cases cited supra note 27. 
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may affect multiple plaintiffs. 132 Krier and Schwab have seized on this 
difference in numerosity to argue that defendants will tend to make 
more efficient choosers because they are less numerous.133 As applied 
to our analysis, Krier and Schwab would argue that defendant-choice 
rules, including the Rule 2 call-option implementation and the Rule 5 
put-option implementation, would tend to dominate plaintiff-choice 
rules. We agree that the additional collective action difficulties of a 
diffuse plaintiff class will, all else being equal, tend to militate toward 
the use of defendant-choice allocations. Furthermore, our decoupling 
result improves upon Krier and Schwab's theory by showing that a 
continuum of defendant-choice allocations can take equivalent advan­
tage of the defendant's private information while providing even more 
nuanced distributive possibilities. 
Nevertheless, we disagree with Krier and Schwab's seemingly ex­
clusive focus on numerosity as the determinant of the more efficient 
chooser. Instead, we believe that selection of the more efficient 
chooser will also tum importantly on which party has a greater infor­
mational advantage relative to the court. All else equal, the party the 
court believes has the more volatile valuation will be the more effi­
cient chooser. 
In many nuisance disputes numerosity and volatility will push the 
court in different directions. The plaintiffs in nuisance disputes often 
include more members than the defendants, but these plaintiffs are 
also likely to have more speculative valuations. Often, courts may 
more easily measure the economic costs of abating or discontinuing 
pollution than assess the noneconomic damages of pollution on sur­
rounding Residents. Even though multiple Residents will often have 
high collective decisionmaking costs, they will also often possess more 
relevant private information in that they will know how much pollu­
tion really harms them.134 
At times, courts should give the choice to multiple Residents and 
accept the resultant collective-action problems, rather than give the 
Polluter the choice and disregard the Residents' private information. 
For example, we believe that the residents in Boomer v. Atlantic Ce­
ment135 might have made better choices than the polluter, notwith­
standing their relative numerosity. Relative to the court, these resi­
dents would have had much more information about their own 
valuations of the entitlement. While we concede that numerosity will 
132. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2342-44 (1996). 
133. Krier & Schwab, supra note 7, at 471-72. 
134. In addition, Residents often will have higher levels of risk aversion than the Pol­
luter, who may in turn have greater opportunities to diversify loss, and hence, Residents will, 
other things being equal, tend to make better choosers. 
135. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
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often militate against giving the choice to multiple residents, the vari­
ance effect will often militate in favor of precisely this brand of alloca­
tive choice. 
Our two-player models also limit the applicability of our analysis 
with regard to the exclusion of potential third-party claimants for ul­
timate ownership of the entitlement in question. In a world in which 
three or more different parties are the potentially most efficient ulti­
mate owner of the entitlement, courts will have more difficulty imple­
menting a liability rule regime. Absent bargaining, however, property 
rules will also perform badly in allocating the entitlement to the most 
efficient owner, unless the imperfectly informed court by chance hap­
pens to allocate the entitlement to its highest valuer. When the liti­
gants can feasibly bargain, the multiplicity of potential highest valuers 
favors a property rule. Liability rules, by contrast, can increase the 
cost of contracting (a) by failing to allocate claims to its potentially 
highest valuers, or (b) by allocating claims to people who do not value 
it highly. For example, when a court gives a partial entitlement to inef­
ficient owners, they will only turn around and try to sell it, and their 
usual incentives to seek inflated prices can impede negotiations with 
the class of potentially highest valuers. Thus, low valuers who mistak­
enly receive a claim on the entitlement can inefficiently hold up the 
transaction. 136 This is also another example of what Heller called the 
anticommons problem: too many people can block the transfer of an 
entitlement to its highest valuing owner.137 As the pool of potentially 
high valuers increases, liability rules of both the single-chooser and 
dual-chooser varieties can exacerbate this holdout or anticommons 
problem. 
E. Cognitive Bias and Wealth Effects 
A central finding of the previous analysis concerns the allocative 
invariance of all implementations within a particular fundamental al­
locative class. For example, we have shown that any defendant-choice 
rule with a particular allocative price (DLJ) will produce identical allo­
cations for any possible sets of private plaintiff and defendant valua­
tions. This invariance result only holds true, however, in the absence 
of wealth and cognitive framing effects. 
As with the Coase theorem's invariance prediction,138 our alloca­
tive invariance finding will not hold true if the chooser's willingness to 
136. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1086. 
137. Heller, supra note 100. 
138. See John J. Donohue, III, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce 
Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549, 550 (1989); Stewart Schwab, A Coasean Experiment 
on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237, 242-43 (1988). 
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pay is affected by its overall wealth.139 Defendant-choice rules that al­
locate larger expected payoffs to the defendant might make the de­
fendant more or less willing to pay a particular allocative price in allo­
cating the entitlement to itself. 
More generally, the extent to which choosers' willingness to pay a 
given price differs from their willingness to accept that same price 
qualifies the allocative invariance result. For both cognitive- and 
wealth-effect reasons, particular choosers will often demand higher 
prices when selling an entitlement than they would willingly pay to 
buy it.140 As Saul Levmore has noted in discussing put options: 
Armed with the legal right to be free of pollution, [a Resident] might 
have demanded $1,000,000, for example before allowing [a Polluter] to 
send effluents her way, so that [the Resident's] damages from [the Pol­
luter's] operation can fairly be said to amount to $1,000,000; but this does 
not mean that [the Resident] could or would pay this amount to stop [the 
Polluter], if the law requires [the Resident] to pay in order to [stop pollu­
tion].141 
This suggests that a range of prices exists (in Levmore's example, 
between $700,000 and $1 ,000,000) in which the plaintiff-residents 
would allocate the entitlement to themselves under a put-option im­
plementation (Rule 6) but would allocate the entitlement to the de­
fendant under a call-option implementation (Rule 4). For these inter­
mediate damage amounts, the law's selection of an initial entitlement 
holder not surprisingly will tend to be sticky. This should not be sur­
prising. Scholars have long known that endowment effects impede 
trade and bargaining in the shadow of property rules; this result car­
ries over to option regimes as well. 
More controversial, however, is whether lawmakers should privi­
lege endowment effects in a cost-benefit calculus. If Residents value 
an entitlement more than a Polluter merely because the court initially 
endows them with it, lawmakers might want to set a low call-option 
price to allow the Polluter to take control of the entitlement and bene­
fit from its own endowment effect. One goal, which courts must trade 
off against other equity goals, focuses on production of a legal regime 
where the entitlement flowed to the person who has the highest will-
139. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-10, 
119-27 (2nd ed. 1989); Stewart J. Schwab, Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and 
Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1 171, 1 178-83 (1989) (book review). 
140. Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory and Ideology in the Coase 
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669, 673 (1979); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Note, 
Policymaking and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Al­
location, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1994). 
141. Levmore, supra note 9, at 2166. 
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ingness to accept. 142 From an efficiency standpoint, this goal would 
rank people by their value of "having" rather than their value of "not 
having." Other things being equal, this standard would lead toward 
giving the initial entitlement to the party with the larger endowment 
effect. 
The proliferation of different single-chooser rules, including the 
call, put, pay-or-be-paid, and pay-or-pay implementations, again, can 
help lawmakers accommodate competing concerns. When cognitive or 
wealth effects cause these implementations to differ allocatively, this 
proliferation will at least permit policymakers more flexibility in bal­
ancing a variety of efficiency and equity concerns. Efficiency might 
demand that the initial entitlement go to the party with the larger en­
dowment effect. But if this is the party that the court believes also is 
the more efficient chooser, then the court can accommodate both of 
these efficiency concerns by giving the party both the initial entitle­
ment and a put option. 
But more work needs to be done to see the extent to which an en­
dowment effect persists under the various implementations of single­
and dual-chooser allocations. The path-breaking mug experiments of 
Kahneman, Knetsh, and Thaler only tested whether entitlements pro­
tected by property rules gave rise to endowment effects. 143 It is much 
less clear whether endowments protected by liability rules, that is, sub­
ject to someone else's call option, give rise to the same effect. In the 
shadow of a call option, the initial entitlement holder has a more tran­
sient, less secure claim to the entitlement and thus might not establish 
the cognitive bond that gives rise to the effect. In fact, Jeff 
Rachlinski and Forest Jourden have recently conducted experiments 
showing that traditional liability (call-option) rules largely extinguish 
the endowment effect.144 But put options or other intermediate im­
plementations, such as the pay-or-be-paid rule may produce different 
142. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 225, 232-34, 245-47 (1991) (claiming that willingness to accept should always be used 
rather than willingness to pay). Russell Korobkin, however, has suggested reasons why allo­
cation of entitlements on the basis of willingness to accept is inappropriate when independ­
ent social norms oppose sales of certain types of entitlements: 
Narrowly stated, our society teaches us that we should not sell some things, although buying 
them is socially acceptable. Although an individual might, in a cultural vacuum, prefer a spe­
cific quantity of money to a certain entitlement, he might feel that selling the entitlement is 
improper and therefore, his WTA will exceed his WTP. This explanation has been called the 
"dignity hypothesis." 
Korobkin, supra note 140, at 691-92. 
143. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase 
Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990). 
144. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Owner­
ship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1545 (1998) (arguing that "the endowment effect might de­
pend on whether the law protects an interest with a property rule or a liability rule"). This 
possibility was first suggested in Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1 102. 
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endowment effects. For example, put-option rules may heighten the 
endowment effect because put-option implementations give the initial 
entitlement holder even more control over the "endowment" than 
traditional property rules, and thus may enhance the solidity of owner­
ship.145 If we view the endowment effect as a source of real value that 
we want to nurture, as opposed to a "status quo bias" or "framing ef­
fect" that we want to overcome,146 then put options may overcome the 
inefficiencies of the holdout problem without destroying the "value of 
having." More generally, however, the infinity of single-chooser rules 
discovered here gives policymakers more flexibility in testing for and 
managing the pros and cons of cognitive bias. 
F. Correlated Valuations 
Our analysis thus far has assumed that the litigants have independ­
ently distributed valuations. While we can plausibly assume this in 
some contexts,147 Kaplow and Shaven have pointed out that a plain­
tiff's and defendant's valuation of physical objects may correlate.148 If 
a plaintiff places a high value on an oilfield or laptop computer, there 
are good reasons to think that a defendant's value may also be high. 
Correlated valuatioris make it more difficult for courts to use liabil­
ity rules to harness the parties' private information. For example, Kap­
low and Shaven have shown that if we can decompose the litigants' 
overall valuations into a "common-value" and an 
"idiosyncratic-value" component,149 courts will have difficulty in set­
ting a damage amount that induces takings so as to increase social wel­
fare. For example, suppose that (i) the litigants have a uniformly dis­
tributed common-value component between $0 and $100; (ii) the 
plaintiff has a uniformly and independently distributed idiosyncratic­
value component between $0 and $100;  and, (iii) the defendant has a 
145. Russell Korobkin, however, has suggested to us that the put option may commodify 
the entitlement in the owner's mind in ways that reduce the endowment effect. Imagine that 
after a pure-bred dog has puppies, a mother tells her daughter she can keep the puppies or, 
after they are weaned, can sell them for $50 to a neighbor who has made a firm offer. The 
daughter's knowledge that she has a put option might stop her from bonding as closely with 
the puppies during the weaning period as she would have otherwise and hence mitigate the 
endowment effect. 
146. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias .and Contract Default Rules, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998). 
147. For example, in many nuisance contexts it is plausible to assume that a Polluter's 
value from polluting will be independent of a Resident's value of nonpollution. 
148. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, at 759. 
149. Id. at 759-60 ("First, suppose that things have a significant common value, that is, a 
component of value that is the same for both the owner and any taker . . . .  Second, assume 
that things also have idiosyncratic value to individuals. Idiosyncratic value derives from 
characteristics of a thing that different individuals evaluate differently, such as the design of 
a home."). 
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uniformly and independently distributed idiosyncratic-value compo­
nent between $0 and $75. A traditional liability rule, Rule 2, with 
damages set equal to the plaintiff's mean valuation of $100 (a $50 
mean common value plus a $50 mean idiosyncratic value) will operate 
less efficiently than a property rule, Rule 1, which simply gave the 
plaintiff the entitlement. 
When the litigants have positively correlated valuations, the court 
will have difficulty setting an allocative price to distinguish between 
unexpectedly high realizations of the common-value component ver­
sus unexpectedly high realizations of the idiosyncratic-value compo­
nent. A Rule 2 with $100 damages would induce the defendant in this 
example to take too often. For example, when the common-value 
component turned out to equal $80, a defendant would take if the de­
fendant's idiosyncratic value fell as low as $20, even though such tak­
ings would inefficiently allocate the entitlement because the defen­
dant's mean idiosyncratic value equals $50. 150 
Restated in the terms of this Article, Kaplow and Shavell's sugges­
tion means that when the litigants have substantially correlated valua­
tions, the optimal delegation is no delegation: courts should allocate 
the entitlement via a property rule rather than delegate the allocative 
decision to the litigants via a liability rule. 
Although Kaplow and Shavell are correct that correlated valua­
tions make it more difficult to harness private valuations, they wrongly 
conclude that property rules work better than liability rules when liti­
gants have positively correlated values. In a separate essay, we show 
that the examples in Kaplow and Shavell's original article systemati­
cally overstate the advantages of property rules by comparing the 
more efficient property rule to a liability rule that has nonoptimal 
damages and the less efficient chooser. 151 But for now, it is sufficient to 
see how nicely dual-chooser rules can respond to the correlated value 
problem. 
Remember that as a traditional liability rule, Rule 2 has the prob­
lem that defendants may take not because they have high idiosyncratic 
values but merely because both litigants have unexpectedly high real­
ized common-values. The court would like defendants to take only if 
their idiosyncratic values are unexpectedly high, but the court cannot 
observe either their common- or idiosyncratic-value components. It 
can only set a single damage figure that might induce defendants to 
take either because they have unexpectedly high idiosyncratic values 
(creating efficient takings), or because both they and the plaintiffs 
have an unexpectedly high common value (creating inefficient tak-
150. Id. , at 760. 
151. See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, A Critique of "Tangibility" as the Basis for 
Property Rules (2001 )  (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
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ings). Although the court cannot observe whether defendants take be­
cause of a high common value or a high idiosyncratic value, the plain­
tiff can. 
Dual-chooser rules respond well to the problem of correlated 
valuations because these rules allow the other side to veto takings 
driven by common-value realizations. The problem with Rule 2 in the 
foregoing example was that defendants might take merely because the 
common-value component was unexpectedly high. A plaintiff­
presumption allocation, however, eliminates this problem by allowing 
the plaintiff to veto takings that are driven by both parties having a 
high common value. Under a plaintiff-presumption allocation, the en­
titlement will ultimately go to the defendant only if the plaintiff's total 
value, common plus idiosyncratic, is less than the damage amount and 
only if the defendant's total value is greater than the damage amount. 
Indeed, in the foregoing example we can show that the optimal dual­
chooser rule produces systematically higher expected joint payoffs 
than the optimal property rule.152 Thus, while correlated valuations 
make optimal delegation a more difficult judicial task, one or two pri­
vate heads can still be better than none. 
G. Bargaining 
Probably the most serious qualification to our analysis thus far 
concerns our assumption of autarky. Our formal model assumes that 
the litigants cannot bargain with each other and considers instead the 
equilibrium allocation and distribution absent negotiations. This as­
sumption can be given two partial defenses, but ultimately much more 
work needs to be done to understand how liability rules should be 
structured in a world where transaction costs are relatively small. In 
this Section, we sketch these two partial defenses for our autarky as­
sumption and then show how dual-chooser allocations induce a new 
type of information forcing that may favor their use when transaction 
costs are relatively low. 
The first partial defense of an autarky assumption is empirical. In 
at least some bilateral contexts, the disputants seem extremely reluc­
tant even to negotiate, much less agree to contract. Ward Farnsworth, 
for example, surveyed nuisance disputants after an initial trial decision 
and found almost without exception that the litigants and their attor­
neys failed even to consider negotiation in the shadow of the law.153 
Enmity between the litigants may produce an important barrier to 
trade and thus inhibit private contract as a means of allocation. 
152. In the foregoing example, Rule 1 produces· an expected payoff of $100, while the 
optimal plaintiff-presumption dual-chooser rule produces an expected payoff of $101 .39. 
153. Farnsworth, supra note 29. 
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Second, an understanding of how liability rules perform when liti­
gants cannot feasibly trade may provide valuable insights into the rela­
tive efficiency of these rules when the litigants can bargain. The autar­
kic payoffs that we have analyzed above become the threat points that 
will deeply influence the litigants' bargaining strategies. Negotiation 
theorists at times refer to such autarkic payoffs as representing the in­
dividual litigants' "reservation prices" for trade, or their "BATNAs" 
("best alternative to negotiated agreement"). 154 Because litigants can­
not be forced through consensual trade to accept less than their 
BA TNA, our previous analysis of how judges might vary the distribu­
tion of payoffs will continue to hold true in a world where bargaining 
feasibly can occur. For example, adopting a defendant-choice alloca­
tion with a relatively high alpha value (a pay-or-be-paid rule) enables 
the court, even when bargaining can occur, to assure the plaintiff a 
higher expected return and the defendant a lower expected return 
than a defendant-choice rule with a put option (Rule 5). 
Kaplow and Shavell, however, have gone further to argue that le­
gal regimes that are relatively more efficient in allocating the entitle­
ment when bargaining is not possible are likely to continue to be more 
efficient as transaction costs subside and bargaining becomes feasible. 
Of course, the Coase theorem teaches that all contractable legal re­
gimes, such as property, single-chooser, and dual-chooser rules, will 
allocate entitlements equally efficiently when transaction costs are nil. 
Nevertheless, Kaplow and Shaven have argued that the relative effi­
ciency of different rules when bargaining cannot take place will tend 
to persist when bargaining becomes possible, but not perfectly. 155 Un­
der this persistence conjecture, the nonconsensual advantage that, say, 
a defendant-choice allocation might have (when the litigants' mean 
valuations are similar and the variance of the defendant's valuation is 
greater than the plaintiff's) relative to the other three single-price 
allocations would be likely to persist if the parties could bargain. For 
Kaplow and Shavell, this nonconsensual headstart that a particular 
rule has over others in promoting allocative efficiency will on average 
persist as transaction costs recede and trade becomes possible. 
If the persistence conjecture is true, then the foregoing analysis 
would end the story. By knowing how best to tailor rules when bar­
gaining was prohibited, judges would perforce know how best to tailor 
rules when bargaining was allowed. Unfortunately, we are not con­
vinced that the persistence conjecture tells the entire story. While it is 
surely the case that the most efficient liability rule under autarky has a 
headstart when bargaining is permitted, it is at least possible that other, 
154. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Jan Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 
VA. L. REV. 323, 331 & nn.26 & 27 (1994). 
155. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 15, passim. 
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consensual attributes of the rules may come to dominate the noncon­
sensual attributes. We know, for example, that the persistence conjec­
ture at most describes only a tendency, because Ayres and 
Talley have provided a numerical counterexample in which a noncon­
sensual advantage of property rules over liability rules did not persist 
once bargaining became possible. 156 Moreover, these authors have 
demonstrated that liability rules have a much stronger "information­
forcing" effect than property rules do. This information-forcing effect 
represents a potential "consensual advantage" of liability rules that 
may be more important in the relative efficiency of different legal re­
gimes when bargaining costs are lower than the nonconsensual advan­
tage that Kaplow and Shaven have emphasized. 
In terms of the foregoing analysis, single-chooser allocations give 
nonchoosers a robust incentive to reveal through bargaining whether 
their value is above or below their mean valuation. For example, imag­
ine that a court establishes a defendant-choice call-option rule in 
which defendants can self-allocate the entitlement when they make a 
payment to plaintiffs of one million dollars, the plaintiffs' estimated 
mean valuation. The plaintiffs can respond by trying either (a) to sell 
the entitlement for less than one million dollars, or (b) to buy the de­
fendants' call option (in essence trying to bribe the defendants not to 
take nonconsensually) .  The plaintiffs as nonchoosers will offer to pay 
the defendants not to take only if the plaintiffs have an actual valua­
tion higher than the court's estimate of their mean valuation, and they 
will offer to sell the underlying entitlement only if they have an actual 
valuation lower than the court's estimate. By merely expressing an in­
terest in one type of trade or another, nonchoosers can thus credibly 
signal whether their actual valuation is higher or lower than the court's 
estimate of their mean valuation. 157 Analogously, plaintiff-choice allo­
cations give the defendants as nonchoosers a robust incentive to signal 
credibly how their actual valuation compares to their mean valuation, 
again, merely by which type of trade they offer to transact. 
If the parties' imperfect information poses the primary barrier to 
trade, it is at least possible that these information-forcing effects will 
dominate the nonconsensual advantages of the different liability rules 
outlined above. In particular, the more efficient choosers in the ab­
sence of bargaining will clearly tend to be the litigants with the more 
speculative valuation. When bargaining can occur, however, the more 
efficient choosers might be the litigants with the less speculative valua-
156. Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1 104. 
157. Under a put implementation of a defendant-choice rule, the plaintiffs would offer 
to pay the defendants not to exercise their put only when the plaintiffs have an actual valua­
tion lower than the court's estimate of their mean valuation, and the plaintiffs would offer to 
pay the defendants for the underlying entitlement only when the plaintiffs have an actual 
valuation higher than the court's estimate of it. 
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tion, for negotiations will quickly allow high variance litigants to nar­
row their observable distributions by credibly signaling whether they 
have a relatively high or low valuation. To date, however, we have not 
succeeded in modeling an example in which, when bargaining can oc­
cur, the litigant with the less speculative valuation became the more 
efficient chooser. But, at a minimum, the information-forcing effect on 
the nonchooser systematically narrows the allocative efficiency differ­
ential between the two single-choice allocations. 
The question of whether our autarkic results persist in the pres­
ence of bargaining becomes all the more interesting when we add to 
the mix the possibility of dual-chooser allocations. Dual-chooser allo­
cations turn out to have an arguably even stronger information-forcing 
effect than single-chooser allocations. While single-chooser allocations 
give one of the litigants, the nonchoosers, an incentive to signal 
whether they have a relatively high or low valuation, dual-chooser al­
locations give both litigants an opportunity to signal credibly whether 
they have a high or a low valuation by merely expressing an interest in 
a particular type of trade. 
Consider, for example, a plaintiff-presumption allocation imple­
mented through a call-call option regime in which the plaintiff receives 
(a) the initial entitlement, (b) subject to the defendant's call option 
(with an exercise price of D17P), but (c) also a call option (with an exer­
cise price of Dnp) to take back the entitlement. In the absence of bar­
gaining, the plaintiff-presumption allocation gives rise to two different 
types of inefficiencies. The first type occurs when the defendant has 
the higher valuation but the plaintiff nonetheless vetoes a defendant 
allocation by exercising its take-back option. This occurs when 
vL1 > vn > DnP· And the Coasean solution would be for the defendant to 
buy the plaintiff's take-back (call) option. The second type of ineffi­
ciency occurs when the defendant has the higher valuation but the de­
fendant nonetheless vetoes a defendant-allocation by failing to exer­
cise its initial call option. This occurs when Dnp > vL1 > vn. And the 
Coasean solution for this inefficiency would be for the defendant to 
buy the underlying entitlement (for some price less than D17p). 
When negotiating in the shadow of this legal rule, the defendants 
can credibly signal their relatively high valuation (vL1 > D17P) by merely 
expressing an interest in paying the plaintiff not to exercise its take­
back option. 158 Conversely, the plaintiff could credibly signal that it has 
a relatively low value (v17 < DrtP) by merely expressing an interest in 
selling its entitlement for a price less than Dnp. Low-value defendants 
would never have a strategic reason for expressing an interest in buy­
ing - much less actually offering to buy - the plaintiff's take-back 
158. The defendant could also credibly signal its high value by exercising its first-stage 
call option. But the information-forcing stressed in the text allows the defendant to signal its 
high valuation even before it is called upon to exercise its first-stage option. 
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option. And high-value plaintiffs would never have a strategic reason 
for expressing an interest in selling - much less actually offering to 
sell - their entitlement for a price less than D nfa. Thus dual-chooser 
allocations create some opportunity for both litigants to credibly 
communicate their relative valuations through the process of negotia­
tion. 
Just as correlated litigant valuations in the discussion above ex­
panded the set of circumstances in which dual-chooser allocations 
yielded greater allocative efficiency, the arguably stronger informa­
tion-forcing properties of dual-chooser allocations may further mili­
tate for their use as trade in the shadow of these rules becomes more 
feasible. A full analysis of liability rules under conditions of low but 
nonzero transaction costs has eluded scholars. The particular ranking 
of the rules' relative efficiency might turn not just on the general char­
acteristics of the litigants' valuation distributions but also on the spe­
cifics of the bargaining procedures that are assumed. 
In this Section, we have tried to argue that autarkic results are of 
interest because (a) some bilateral disputants face high transaction 
costs; (b) the nonconsensual heads tart that we have identified may 
tend to persist when bargaining is possible; and ( c) the autarkic pay­
offs that we have derived become the threat points that will signifi­
cantly inform the bargaining behavior of the parties. Our finding that 
dual-chooser allocations create different and arguably stronger infor­
mation-forcing effects than those previously identified for single­
chooser allocations suggests, however, that the autarkic analysis may 
not tell the complete story. On this dimension we are forced to repeat 
the hackneyed and unsatisfactory conclusion that more research on 
this issue is warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
While we have often motivated our analysis with a nuisance exam­
ple, this Article is really about a deeper and more canonical problem 
about how courts should allocate rivalrous entitlements when the 
court has poorer information than the litigants about who is the higher 
valuing owner. Most basically, we have considered a conflict in which 
the court - even after discovery and an adversarial trial - has only a 
probabilistic assessment of each litigant's value, whereas each litigant 
knows (or at least has better information) about how much it values 
the entitlement. In such a basic bilateral dispute with imperfect judi­
cial information, the court faces a nontrivial problem of how best to 
allocate claims to the entitlement. 
When the private litigants are better informed than the court, the 
court can usefully adopt an allocative rule that harnesses some of the 
litigants' private information. This Article has shown that courts may 
choose from four basic allocations. The traditional liability rules -
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Rules 2 and 4 - exemplify two of these basic allocations: the plaintiff­
choice and defendant-choice allocations. But we have shown that 
there are two other allocations - dual-chooser allocations - which 
not only have common-law analogs but which, under specific circum­
stances, can produce greater allocative efficiency than single-chooser 
allocations. 
Moreover, we have shown there are an infinite number of imple­
mentations of each type of rule which are allocatively equivalent but 
which allow the court to distribute the total expected payoff of the liti­
gants as it sees fit. This means that courts, in resolving bilateral dis­
putes, can decouple allocative and distributive concerns. By selecting 
the more efficient chooser or choosers and by setting the efficient allo­
cative price, a court can maximize ex post allocative efficiency. More­
over, independent of these core allocative decisions, the court has a 
free hand to distribute the expected payoffs as it wants. Thus, distribu­
tively concerned courts are free to pursue equity or promote ex ante 
efficiency without sacrificing their natural desire to see that the enti­
tlement ends up in the hands of the highest valuing user (the ex post 
allocative efficiency concern). This decoupling result and our analysis 
of dual-chooser allocations are our central findings. 
While we have focused on how courts should structure liability 
rules, our analysis does have implications for the equally important 
choice of when courts should opt for liability rules over property rules. 
Legal scholars have generated a number of rationales for why prop­
erty rules might dominate liability rules/59 We focus here on three ra­
tionales for property rules that the foregoing analysis qualifies. One of 
the oldest rationales states that property rules induce trade better than 
liability rules when transaction costs remain relatively low. Ayres and 
Talley seriously undermined this rationale by showing that liability 
rules have a greater information-forcing effect than property rules and 
by providing examples in which liability rules were more effective in 
inducing trade. And this Article has extended this criticism by showing 
that dual-chooser rules also have new and potentially stronger infor­
mation-forcing qualities that may also give dual-chooser rules a con­
sensual advantage over property rules. 
As a second rationale, many authors, including Ayres and Talley,160 
have argued that property rules give individuals better ex ante invest­
ment incentives to create the disputed entitlement to begin with. The 
idea here is that Krier will be less likely to build a new house if 
Schwab has the option to take nonconsensually and pay Krier's mean 
valuation. This result makes sense, however, only if we limit our atten-
159. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 9; Rose, supra note 9. 
160. Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 1743. 
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tion to the call implementations of liability rules.161 The aforemen­
tioned decoupling result shows that both single-chooser and dual­
chooser implementations can yield even greater expected payoffs for 
either litigant than a property rule regime can yield in the absence of 
bargaining. The decoupling result seriously qualifies the investment 
rationale for using property rules because it suggests that courts can 
retain the ex post information-harnessing benefits of liability rules 
without undermining ex ante investment incentives. 
Finally, and most recently, Kaplow and Shavell have argued that 
property rules will tend to work better than liability rules when the 
litigants have correlated valuations. They have asserted that liability 
rules will tend to be less efficient because choosers will allocate the en­
titlement to themselves not because they have high idiosyncratic 
valuations but because the common-value element of their valuations 
takes on an unexpectedly high value and exceeds the court's allocative 
price.162 Their analysis makes eminent sense in comparing the effi­
ciency of property rules to single-chooser rules, 163 but as we have dem­
onstrated above, they did not consider the possibility of dual-choice 
rules, thereby limiting their analysis. Dual-chooser rules give both liti­
gants a veto over certain allocations and can therefore better select for 
circumstances when the idiosyncratic and not the common valuation is 
driving the allocative choice. 
In sum, the option analysis of liability rules as a theoretical matter 
tends to tilt increasingly toward the use of liability rules. In some sense 
this occurs as a natural byproduct of entering more liability-rule 
horses into the race to compete against the two property-rule stalwarts 
(Rules 1 and 3). Still, there are strong reasons why property rules will 
at times dominate,164 but this Article and other recent efforts have 
made progress in identifying narrower but firmer grounds on which 
property rules can stake their superiority. When liability rules domi­
nate, however, lawmakers would be well advised to consider the fuller 
161. Even under the call implementation, it is not clear why this argument makes sense. 
If Krier at the time of investment does not yet know his true valuation, then promising him 
his mean valuation should not deter his investment. Indeed, if he is risk averse it may de­
crease the variance in his payoffs and make him more willing to invest. If, however, Krier at 
the time of investing knows his future valuation, then promising him his mean valuation, 
should Schwab take the entitlement, may deter him from some valuable types of investment 
when his actual value turns out to be higher than the court's perception of his mean valua­
tion. 
162. Conversely, choosers may allocate the entitlement to the nonchoosers, not because 
they have low idiosyncratic valuations but because their common-value element takes on an 
unexpectedly low value that falls short of the court's allocative price. 
163. Although, as we note above, supra text accompanying note 151, Kaplow and 
Shavell fail to compare the property rule to the most efficient single-chooser rule because 
their example uses the less efficient chooser and nonoptimal damages. 
164. Ayres & Talley, supra note 9, at 214; Epstein, supra note 9, at 2195; Rose, supra 
note 9, at 2180. 
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panoply of liability-rule implementations than merely the call-option 
rules of Calabresi and Melamed. 
To get a fuller sense of why other implementations of the four ba­
sic allocations might be useful, it is useful in closing to speculate on 
how the foregoing analysis might be applied to breach of contract. 165 
Contractual entitlements are normally protected by a single type of li­
ability rule. The promisor has a call option on the promisee's entitle­
ment to performance. In other words, through breach, the promisor 
can take the promisee's entitlement to performance and merely pay 
compensatory damages set at the court's best estimate of the pro­
misee's expected value of performance. Thus, unless the court feels 
the situation warrants the extraordinary damage award of specific per­
formance, the standard remedy implements a kind of Rule 2. Rechar­
acterized in this way, we can see that contract law lags behind nuisance 
law - because while at least one court (in Spur) 166 has applied 
Calabresi and Melamed's Rule 4, contract courts do not typically allow 
promisees to choose between specific performance or damages. 
Accordingly, contract remedies inefficiently place allocative au­
thority solely in the hands of the plaintiff promisor. True expectation 
damages, as an implementation of a defendant-choice allocation, can 
induce defendants to breach efficiently, given their private informa­
tion about the costs of breach. But the foregoing analysis suggests that, 
at times, the plaintiff will be better placed to decide whether perform­
ance should take place, or at still other times both the plaintiff and the 
defendant will make better allocative decisions (than either one or the 
other could do by themselves). The traditional expectation damage 
rule does a good job of harnessing the defendant-promisor's private 
information but does not harness the private information of the plain­
tiff-promisee. At times (particularly when the litigants have similar 
variances but different means), the court would do better to establish 
a dual-chooser allocation, announce an allocative price, and then give 
each party the opportunity to veto the defendant's breach. 
Or, as an alternative, courts could give the promisees an option to 
increase the damages they would receive for the promisors' breach by 
making a firm offer to pay more for performance.167 Thus, after a seller 
repudiated a contract through anticipatory breach, a court might give 
the buyer the option of offering the seller an additional amount to per-
165. To begin, the absence of contract law from Calabresi and Melamed's view of the 
cathedral is striking. The subject might have been omitted because contracts didn't fit their 
theory well. Calabresi and Melamed have been understood by subsequent scholars to have 
argued that liability rules tend to dominate when transaction costs are high but that property 
rules dominate when transaction costs are low. Contractual entitlements don't fit because 
they are protected by liability rules even though transaction costs were sufficiently low for 
the parties to enter into an initial contract. 
166. Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972). 
167. Ayres & Balkin, supra note 9, at 746. 
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form. The seller could either accept this amount and perform, or 
breach the contract and pay ordinary damages plus the additional 
amount that the buyer offered to pay.168 Judges could effect this scheme 
by instructing the jury to determine ordinary expectation damages 
(without knowledge of the attempted modification) and then simply 
adding this augmentation to the jury's award. This mechanism would 
allow the plaintiff-buyers to signal credibly when their valuation of 
performance exceeded the provable mean valuation.169 The defendant­
sellers would then face a more authentic allocative price in deciding 
whether to breach. 
Both contract and nuisance law provide rich settings in which to 
apply our analysis, but others exist as well. For example, many coun­
tries use "compulsory licensing" schemes to mitigate the bilateral mo­
nopoly problems of "blocking patents." 17° Compulsory licenses, of 
course, amount to a call-option implementation of a single-choice al­
location. By now, however, grants of the allocative choice to the other 
side or to both sides in a blocking patent dispute obviously might yield 
superior results, and courts might then usefully consider pay-or-be­
paid implementations to adjust the expected distribution. At the end 
of the day, bilateral disputes over rivalrous entitlements do not come 
close to describing the "cathedral" of allocative dilemmas facing 
courts, but they represent a substantial enough proportion of the 
world to justify our inquiry. 
168. Courts should limit the buyer's ability to augment the seller's potential damages to 
circumstances in which performance can feasibly occur. Otherwise, buyers might make an 
inflated offer for performance (that is, an offer that exceeds their private valuation of per­
formance) if they know that changed circumstances have rendered the seller's performance 
impossible. See id. at 747 n.137. 
169. Buyers deciding how much extra to offer for performance would have a powerful 
incentive not to offer too much. If the offer grows too generous, the seller would simply ac­
cept it and perform. 
170. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales and 
the Reality, 33 IDEA 349 (1987) (noting that blocking patents are one of the three most 
common conditions for compulsory licensing abroad). Countries that have compulsory li­
censes for blocking patents include Australia, China, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand and Switzerland. See ROBERT MERGES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
BARGAINING BREAKDOWN: THE CASE OF IMPROVEMENT INVENTIONS AND BLOCKING 
PATENTS 30-31 (1994). U.S. patent law also mandates compulsory licenses with regard to 
nuclear power and environmental engineering technologies. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 
9, at 1093. 
